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The economic analysis of vertical restraints has been the subject of very active research during the last 
decade. This has resulted in a substantial modification of the generalised perception that economists had 
at the beginning of the 19ao·s about the economic consequences of vertical restraints and the treatment 
to  be  given  by  competition  policy  to  vertical  agreements.  While  in  the  early  19ao·s  economists 
considered vertical restraints as being relatively innocuous for competition,  nowadays, economists tend 
to be  much more cautious in  the assessment of the welfare impact of vertical restraints and  introduce 
substantial qualifications in their recommendations to competition polic makers. 
This change in the economists• perception of the effects of vertical restraints has been due to the much 
more  sophisticated  tools  currently  available for the economic analysis of markets.  Basically,  the  new 
approach to the study of vertical restraints permits to take into consideration the existence of imperfect 
competition  both  at the  levels of production  and  distribution.  This allows us to consider the  impact of 
vertical restraints on competition among producers on one side and distributors on the other. 
The purpose of this  paper is  to  study the advantages and  disadvantages of alternative treatments of 
vertical restraints in the framework of European competition policy. It is evident that in order to meet that 
objective, all  recent contributions of economic analysis have to be taken  into account.  Here below,  we 
present  our  interpretation  of  the  main  learnings  that  can  be  drawn  from  economic  analysis  for 
competition policy making. 
In  section  II  of the  paper we describe and  define different types of vertical  restraints as  perceived  by 
modern  Industrial Economics.  Section  Ill presents a brief e.  Section  Ill presents a brief account of the 
current legal framework affecting vertical restraints in  the EU.  The core of the paper is dedicated to the 
economic evaluation of different kinds of vertical restraints and provide an economic reading of the new 
findings  with  a  view  to  defining  guidelines  for  European  competition  policy.  In  the  conclusions,  we 
present our main policy recommendations on the basis of theeconomic literature reviewed . 
On the basis of the analytical evidence available, we conclude that no .. per se  ..  rule can be applied to the 
treatment of vertical restraints by competition policy. However, the cost of evaluating each agreement on 
a one-by-one basis may not be justified  in  many cases.  It is  possible to characterise certain situations 
where the threat that vertical restraints can pose to competition can  be considered as negligeable. The 
existence of active inter-brand competition  plays a crucial role  in  the definition of those  .. safe harbour  .. 
situations. 2 
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45 I.  INTRODUCTION. 
Most economic transactions between consumers of final goods and services and the suppliers of 
those  goods  and  services  take  the  form  of arms-length  transactions.  Consumers  change  shops  or 
products bought as prices change and as they modify their preferences over time and there is seldom 
any long term relationship between any particular consumer and the supplier of the good or service 
bought I. However, as we go up in the ladder of  the value-added chain, arm-length transactions become 
less and  less frequent.  Suppliers of primary  inputs,  intermediate products,  manufacturers,  wholesale 
distributors and retailers are often bound by long term  contracts or agreements.  This  is  particularly 
frequent  in the case of the  distribution stages.  Retailers  and wholesalers normally offer a relatively 
constant range of products which leads them to purchase and stock the same products from the same 
manufacturers for a long period of  time. To minimise transaction costs, producers and distributors tend 
to  sign  medium  or  long  terms  supply  contracts  allowing  them  to  maintain  a  steady  business 
environment with continuous supplies under relatively stable conditions during the relevant time span 
for each line of  business. 
Any contract establishes obligations on the signing parties and has an influence on the way those 
parties will behave from  that moment on  in  the  market.  In that sense,  we  can say that competition 
conditions  are  modified  by  those  long  term  agreements.  Sometimes,  those  agreements just aim  at 
solving  problems due to market imperfections  or market failures.  Under certain circumstances,  the 
resulting modifications in competition conditions may not imply restrictions of competition, at least in 
the  legal  sense  of this  term  as  interpreted  in  European  competition  practice.  In  other  cases,  the 
modifications in competition conditions may be acceptable because despite restricting competition to a 
certain degree, they may have beneficial net effects on welfare that justify their existence. 
However,  those  agreements  and  contracts  give  the  opportunity  to  the  parties  involved  to 
introduce clauses or mechanisms having an adverse impact on competition, through the elimination of 
competitors,  market  sharing  or any  other  way  and  hence,  require  the  intervention  of competition 
regulators. Sometimes, the restrictions of  competition may not be the objective pursued by the parties to 
the agreement, but just a non-desired effect of the  agreement.  Even in those circumstances, at least 
under  European  competition  rules,  those  agreements  should  be  the  subject  of modification  or 
prohibition to avoid their negative effects on competition. 
In the  presence of a notification or a complaint involving  a vertical agreement,  competition 
authorities have to assess their economic impact in order to make a legal assessment of the agreement. 
The  economic  theory  of vertical  restraints  has  developed  considerably  in  the  last  ten  years  (see 
Waterson  (1994)  and  Rey  (1994)  for  surveys  on  this  evolution).  We  have  gone  from  a  general 
perception about the innocuous nature of vertical restraints2 that prevailed in the early 80's and which 
found its most clear formulation in the US  Guidelines of 1985, to a more sceptical view in which the 
impact  of the  agreement  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the  circumstances  of the  agreement.  More 
The  purchase of durable goods requiring  maintenance or the existence of guarantees for 
certain  products  can  be  considered  as  long  term  relationships.  However,  in  both  cases  there 
usually is just one  main  purchase  involved  in  both types of cases  and  not repeated  or recurrent 
transactions as there are between producers and distributors. 
2  Usually,  in  economic theory prices  are  linear,  i.e.  the  buyer pays the  seller  an  amount 
proportional to the quantity so proportional to the quantity bought. Vertical restraints appear when 
vertical  relationships involve more complex contracting arrangements,  such  as  the exigence of a 
given resale  price,  franchise fees,  minimum quantity fixing or some sort of exclusive relationship 
tying  buyer  and  seller.  In  section  II  below  we  present  a  complete  characterisation  of  vertical 
restraints. 
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sophisticated modelling of the complexities of vertical relations have allowed to obtain new insights 
that often warn us about the consequences of  vertical restraints for competition. 
This state of affairs makes life harder for competition authorities. As the US  Supreme Court 
decision has shown in the Kodak case, the situation is no longer as easy as in both the pre-Sylvania and 
post-Sylvania  "worlds".  A  favourable  or negative  a  priori  predisposition  with  respect  to  vertical 
restraints can no longer be supported by economic analysis.  This  implies that per se  approaches to 
vertical  restraints  cannot  be  maintained.  The  assessment  of the  competition  impact  of vertical 
agreements has now to  be largely dependent on the economic analysis of  the case. 
However, this is not the only source of new difficulties for competition regulators. In the first 
place, quite often, the economic evaluation of  a case would require highly sophisticated methods which 
are  not available  to  competition  agencies.  Sometimes,  the  cost of the  economic  analysis  and  the 
expected probability of getting a clear-cut answer from  economic theory may not justify the cost of 
carrying out that analysis. Secondly, economic theory does not have a complete set of  answers to all the 
problems that appear in the context of  vertical restraints. Areas such as the economic analysis of  buying 
power are starting to be studied now. Moreover, the proliferation of clauses or the legal complexity of 
the  agreement  may  make  it  intractable  by  economic  analysis.  Finally,  it  should  be  recalled  that 
economic rationality is not the only source of anti-trust. Social, political or in general, other types of 
"fairness"  or "equity"  considerations  and  not just efficiency  in  the  allocation  of resources  are  also 
objectives of anti-trust. Under certain circumstances, it may be difficult to maintain full  compatibility 
between economic rationality and  some of these considerations,  which has  to  be  considered  as  an 
additional difficulty for anti-trust authorities. 
The purpose of  this paper is to provide a "state of the art" description of the economic analysis 
of vertical restraints which can be helpful for the design of policy options for the future treatment of 
vertical restraints by competition policy in Europe. This paper should be the basis for the chapter on the 
Economics of vertical restraints of  the Green Book the Commission will publish in  1996. With a view 
to provide operational guidelines in that chapter, we shall try to follow the following two principles 
here. 
1.  Firstly, we will try to provide a reading of the economic literature in this field in the light of the 
structure of article 85 of the Treaty, regulations and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.  In 
other words,  we will try to  translate the main results of the  literature  in  terms of the concepts 
included in that article such as "restriction of competition", "benefits to consumers", etc. This will 
require the development of an economic interpretation of those legal terms.  This  is  provided in 
section III below. The contents of  that section is our personal interpretation of  that article and, like 
the rest of  the paper, does not represent in any way the official position of  the Commission. 
2.  Secondly, we will strive to concentrate on robust results. The final objective of  this exercise is to 
provide a solid basis for a policy document and not to produce an academic survey of  the literature 
for research purposes. The existence of theoretical possibilities for certain effects are useful for us 
only  insofar  as  they  can  be  tested  by  competition  authorities  with  a  relatively  simple  set of 
analytical  instruments. In the same sense,  it  is  also  important for this exercise to  clarify which 
questions can and which ones cannot be solved by economic analysis. 
Vertical restraints can be quite complex in nature. They can also be present in different stages of 
the  value  added  chain  as  they  can  affect  suppliers  of primary  inputs  in  their  relations  with 
manufacturers,  manufacturers in their relations with wholesalers or the  latter in  their relations with 
retailers.  They can also affect final  products,  inputs,  intermediate products or even intangible goods 
such as technological know-how. Moreover, vertical restraints are seldom present in an isolated or pure 
form. In most cases, vertical restraints appeared combined in the same contract or agreement and the 
direction of the effects of each restraint may be different. Economic analysis has necessarily to take 
place in a simplified environment. In this paper, we will deal with each type of vertical restraint in an isolated way. Furthermore, we will restrict ourselves to a simplified "vertical structure" that will consist 
of  a manufacturer of  final products, who does not get involved in any type of  distribution activities and 
deals with one or several distributors, who face final consumers of  the good in question. 
The structure of  the paper is the following. In the next section we present a basic interpretation 
of the nature and effects of  vertical restraints from an economic point of view. In section III we carry 
out a simple interpretation of the text of article 85  from an economic perspective. Sections IV and V 
constitute the core of  the paper.  There we present an economic analysis of  vertical restraints and then 
discuss  their  policy  implications.  Finally,  section  V  summarises  the  analysis  and  provides  policy 
recommendations. 
II. THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: What are vertical restraints ? 
Most relationships between manufacturers and distributors use more than wholesale prices.  Instead, 
they are often governed by contractual provisions, broadly named "vertical restraints", that not only set 
more general terms for payments (non-linear prices, royalties, fees, etc.), but also alter one or the other 
party's behaviour (resale price maintenance aims for example at monitoring distributors' pricing policy, 
whereas the granting of  exclusive territories limits manufacturers' development policy). 
From an economic perspective, we can identify three different groups of explanations for the existence 
and nature of  these agreements on the basis of  their origin, objectives and effects. 
Vertical restraints as firms' responses to market failures and imperfections. In the relationships between 
producers and distributors and in the horizontal relationships between producers and distributors 
that compete against each other, certain market failures or imperfections may arise that justify the 
introduction  of clauses  in  their  contractual  relationships  to  avoid  those  adverse  effects.  For 
example, in the producer-reltailer relationship, the existence of  some market power at the producers 
level implies that retailers do not gain all the benefits of actions taken to improve sales such as 
advertising that will accrue to the manufacturer. In that case, retailers will tend to maintain those 
sales efforts at a socially sub-optimal level. Vertical restraints can be introduced in that relationship 
as a response to market imperfections in order to avoid the negative impact of that externality. In 
the following pages we will try to identify different circumstances in which vertical relationships 
may arise as a consequence of  market failures and imperfections. 
Vertical restraints as  anti-competitive instruments. In other cases, vertical restraints can be used by 
firms  as  instruments  to  increase  their  market  power  at  the  expenses  of actual  or  potential 
competitors,  business  partners  (either  maunfacturers  or  distributors)  and/or  consumers.  It is 
important to bear in mind that, even though some vertical restraints may have their origin in the 
existence of market failures or imperfections, they can in fact tum out to be instruments against 
competition if they have that effect. Therefore, the classification of vertical restraints in these two 
groups does not just depend on their origin or object but also on their final-intended or unintended-
effects. 
Vertical restraints resultina from "prisoners-dilemma situations". Under certain circumstances, vertical 
restraints  may arise as an unwanted market outcome.  Even though firms'  might collectively be 
ineterested in not engaging in certain types of contracts  with vertical restraints, non-cooperative 
competition between them may lead them to introduce them. (Chang 1992) 
Below we briefly describe the most common vertical restraints, without paying attention to their origin, 
object or effects for the time being.  3 
3  This classification builds on the classification proposed in Rey and Tirole (  1986). 
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a.  Payment schemes 
A uniform price constitutes a "linear price", according to which the payment is proportional to 
the  quantity bought by the distributor.  Several provisions allow the firms to depart from  this  linear 
pricing rule. 
i.  The simplest form of nonlinear pricing schemes consists in including, besides the (uniform) 
wholesale price, a .franchise fee (this combination is also referred to as a two-part tarift). By definition, 
a franchise fee is a payment where the amount due does not depend on the quantity purchased from the 
manufacturer. The fee  may however depend on factors  such as the population within some specified 
distance  of the  distributor's  location.  Also,  the  fee  may  be  a  one-time  charge  or  may  be  due 
periodically, e.g. annually. 
Other forms  of non-linear tariffs  include  progressive  rebates  on the  quantity  bought  by  the 
distributors  (quantity  discounts).  Note  that  it  suffices  to  observe  who  carries  the  manufacturer's 
products to enforce a franchise  fee  provision, whereas more general  non-linear tariffs  require more 
information to be enforced (and may be constrained by legal restrictions). In the case of progressive 
quantity rebates, for example, the distributors could get the highest rebate by "pooling" their orders. To 
avoid this arbitrage the manufacturer must be able to observe not only the quantity bought but also the 
quantity sold by each distributor. More generally, nonlinear prices give distributors incentives to set-up 
a secondary market, making the non-linear pricing policy ineffective.4 
ii.  Royalties are another kind of payment, based on the distributor's sales, measured either in 
units or in revenue. Contrarily to linear or nonlinear wholesale tariffs, royalties do not depend solely on 
the on the quantity bought by the distributor from the manufacturer: they depend on actual sales instead 
of potential ones, and sometimes, they depend as well on the sales of other goods. In effect, royalties 
allow the manufacturer to impose a tax on rivals' products. 5 Note that the use of  royalties supposes that 
the manufacturer is able to monitor the distributor's sales. 
All  these  different  payment  structures  directly  affect  the  sharing  of the  "pie"  between  the 
manufacturer and the distributor, but also indirectly affect the "targets" (final prices, promotional effort, 
risk sharing, etc.) that determine the size of  the pie. 
b.  Provisions that limit the distributor's rights 
i.  Resale price maintenance  is  a  provision  according  to  which  the  final  price  charged  by 
distributors to consumers is  set by the manufacturer. This restriction has  several variants,  including 
price ceilings, price floors, non-binding "recommended" or advertised prices. Resale price maintenance 
or price floors supposes that price cuts can be detected at reasonable cost. Note that price cuts can also 
take the form of  non-monetary concessions: unregistered services, free delivery, and so forth. 
4  Arbitrage  is  still  possible  if  the  average  price  increases  with  the  quantity  bought  (the 
opposite of progressive  quantity discounts).  In  the absence  of arbitrage,  small  distributors enjoy 
lower  (average)  prices.  If arbitrage  is  possible,  however,  small  distributors  would  then  have  an 
incentive to increase their orders  and  resell  to larger distributors.  More generally,  whenever unit 
(wholesale)  prices are  not uniform the centralization and  reallocation of distributors' orders allow 
them to minimize their average unit price.  · 
5  A  wholesale price  w  and  a royalty rate  r  are  equivalent to a  wholesale  price w'  =  w + r 
and  a  tax t = r  on  rival  products.  Free  disposal  rules  out negative  w's,  so  that the tax on  rival 
goods cannot however exceed  the total  wholesale  price  for the manufacturer's product:  t = r  < 
w' =w+r. (2) 
ii.  Quantity fixing is a provision that specifies the quantity to be bought by the retailer.  Variants 
of  this restraint include quantity forcing, which imposes to purchase a minimum quantity, and quantity 
rationing, which specifies a maximum quota.  If demand is known and is a function of the final price 
only, then quantity forcing is .equivalent to a price ceiling and quantity rationing to a price floor -- and 
thus quantity fixing is equivalent to resale price maintenance. 6 (Another variant requires the distributor 
to achieve a minimum sales revenue.) 
iii.  Under an exclusive dealing agreement, the distributor agrees  not to  engage  in  any other 
business that competes directly with the manufacturer's activities (or even in  any other business). A 
variant consists of  a "requirements contract" which requires the distributor to buy all goods exclusively 
from  the manufacturer.  Practical variations of exclusive dealing are exclusive purchasing and,  to a 
certain extent, selective distribution. 
iv.  Tie-in provisions imposes on the distributor the obligation to buy one or more goods from 
the manufacturer in addition to the ones that the distributor initially wants to carry on. Use of a tie-in 
supposes that the manufacturer can verify the goods carried on by the distributor, particularly if some of 
the  goods  provided  by  the  manufacturer  are  priced  above  the  market  price  for  such  products.  A 
particular  type  of tie-in  consists  of full  line  forcing,  which  requires  the  distributor  to  carry  the 
manufacturer's whole range of products.  Full  line forcing  often  is  associated with exclusive dealing 
obligations, but either obligation may be included in an agreement without the other. 
c.  Provisions that limit both parties' rights 
Territorial or customer provisions may limit the territory or group of  customers that a particular 
distributor  may  serve.  By  granting  a  distributor  an  exclusive  territory,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
manufacturer commits himself not to allow any other distributor to serve the customers in this territory, 
thereby protecting the distributor from  intraband competition in the given territory. "Territories" need 
not refer to geographical ones, but may as well refer to any kind of segmentation of the market. If for 
example the  manufa~turer's products are  distributed both by mail  order and through  retail  stores,  a 
"territory" might be the mail order part of the market.  Other examples are the distinctions between 
business and non-business customers or between small businesses and large firms. 
Exclusive territories may impose more or less strict restrictions.  Less strict provisions stipulate 
that the  manufacturer only commits himself not to compete actively with the  distributor  in  a given 
territory (either directly or through other distributor)  and the  distributor undertakes  not to  compete 
actively for customers in other territories.  This is  for example  t~e case when the manufacturer only 
dictates  the  location  of outlets,  but  consumers  are  free  to  choose  between  them:  in  that  case,  a 
.  distributor  cannot  set  up  another  outlet  without  the  manufacturer's  approval,  but  can  still  sell  to 
customers coming from  outside his territory.  Slightly stricter provisions prevent the distributor from 
advertising outside his territory, while absolute exclusive territories simply prevents him from selling to 
customers that are not part of his territory --and grants him a monopoly position for the manufacturer's 
products in his own territory, thereby completely dividing the market among distributors. Also, in some 
instances these territorial restrictions are combined with no-reselling provisions. 7 
6  If for example the distributor can  sell to or buy from other distributors, however, then the 
equivalence between price and quantity controls vanishes. 
7  This issue there is whether customer restrictions also prevent the distributor from reselling 
to other distributors (that may or may not be  approved by the manufacturer). The European Union 
for example allows in  some instances the use of exclusive territories, but prevents manufacturers 
from banning parallel imports. Hence, a non-registered distributor in a given territory (country) can 
buy from (registered) distributors from another country. 
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The  enforceability  of territorial  provtstons  critically  depends  on  their  strictness  and  on 
institutional constraints. For example, specifying the number and/or the location of outlets is relatively 
straightforward, whereas a distributor's commitment not to compete outside his territory may be more 
difficult to enforce. The strictest provisions are likely to raise the most difficult enforcement issues;  in 
that case, the manufacturer or distributors that are being cheated must be able to trace consumers8 and 
to prove, in case of cheating, that the distributor was aware of their origin, or at least negligent in not 
obtaining the information. 
These various restraints of course do not exhaust the list of provisions that manufacturers and 
distributors might include in their contracts. Other controls or obligations on either party are likely to 
be important, and the more complex the relationship is, the more numerous these other provisions can 
be.  The  manufacturer  may  for  example  commit  himself to  a  minimal  product  quality,  to  specific 
(nation-wide) advertising, technical help,  professional training or accountant services; the distributor 
may commit himself to specific levels of promotional effort or customer service. Some other clauses 
may limit the distributor's right to compete with the manufacturer after termination of  the relationship. 
III.  ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Article  85( 1)  prohibits  "as  incompatible with the common market:  all  agreements  between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of  undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition  within  the  common  market".  Article  85(3)  provides  that  agreements,  decisions  or 
practices  that otherwise  would  be  prohibited  by  article  85( 1)  may  be  exempted  if they  meet  four 
conditions.  First, two positive conditions must be  satisfied:  an agreement may be exempted if it (i) 
"contributes to improving the production or distribution of  goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress"  while (ii)  "allowing consumers a fair  share of the  resulting  benefit".  An  agreement that 
satisfies these two conditions can be exempted only if it also (i) does not "impose on the undertakings 
concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives" and (ii) does 
not "afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition with respect to  a substantial 
part of  the products in question".  Exemptions are allowed either by decisions on individual agreements 
or by block exemption regulations (Regulati0n of  the Council No.  19/65, OJEC  533  (1965) empowers 
the Commission to apply Article  85, paragraph 3 by block exemption regulation.).9 
Determining  whether  a  particular  vertical  arrangement  falls  under  Article  85(1)  therefore 
requires  an  assessment of its  impact on  competition.  Unfortunately,  although  competition  is  a  key 
concept  in  the  analysis  of market  economies,  there  does  not  exist  a  single,  well-defined  and 
unambiguous  measure  for  it.  Looking  at final  prices,  for  example,  may  not suffice if the  use  of a 
vertical restraint results simultaneously in a price increase for one product but a price decrease for other 
products. Also, in some instances, a particular arrangement may lead to a transitory increase in prices 
and, at the same time, to enhancements in manufacturing and distribution (or, precisely, in the interface 
8  This is  likely to be  easier at the wholesale level, that is,  when distributors are  wholesalers 
whose customers are  retailers or other types of outlets, of which an  exhaustive list can be  made 
and  kept  updated  at a  reasonable  cost.  At the  final  customer level,  it is  also  possible  in  some 
instances to trace consumers through e.g. the use of warranty cards that each  customer has to 
send back to the manufacturer. 
9  Article 85(  1)  is not applied to agreements that do not affect trade between Member States 
or  exerts  no  appreciable  effect  on  market  conditions  (i.e.,  if  the  market  shares  of  the  firms 
involved do not exceed  5 per cent and  if their combined  annual turnover within the EC  does not 
exceed 200 million ECU  - Commission Note on agreements of minor importance of 3  September 
1986.  OJEC No.  C  231  of 12  September  1986). between the manufacturing and distribution stages), eventually resulting in tougher "competition" and 
lower prices in the future (either because these technological advances are then copied by other firms, 
or because the generated profits are  invested to further  improve technology  in  the  future).  In  such 
instances, should we focus on current prices, on future prices ? 
Economic analysis provides instruments to measure economic "efficiency". Cost functions, for 
instance, can be used to measure productive efficiency, while firms' profits provide a measure of their 
economic  welfare.  Likewise,  and  even  though  this  is  a  more  debatable  issue,  consumer surplus  --
formally  defined  as  the  integral  of their  demand  function-- can  be  used · to  measure  consumers' 
economic welfare.1 0 The sum of  all firms' profits and of consumer surplus can then be used to measure 
total economic welfare --and discounted  sums allow  for  a dynamic  perspective.  However,  concepts 
such  as  "restriction of competition"  do  not have  a clear correspondence with  any standard welfare 
economics  concept.  Thus,  the  economic  interpretation  of European  competition  law  requires  the 
development of  a correspondence between standard economic concepts with the relevant legal concepts 
appearing in the Treaty and Court judgements. What follows  is  our economic interpretation of these 
legal texts. 
In order to be able to distinguish from  an economic point of view, between cases or situations 
compatible with European competition rules from those which are not compatible with those rules, it is 
necessary to establish some type of correspondence between the legal concepts used in the Treaty and 
the concepts and propositions traditionally used by economic analysis. 
Modifications  of· competition  conditions  resulting  from  agreements  between  producers  and 
distributors do  not necessarily have a direct or net  ne~ative impact on  competition. Article 85  of the 
Treaty establishes that agreements between undertakings that affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common  market  are  prohibited  and  void,  unless  they  can  benefit  from  an  individual  or  group 
exemption.  This  legal  construction  implies  that  many  agreements  meeting  the  broad  prohibition 
conditions established by Art. 85 .1. may still be acceptable from the point of  view of competition rules, 
if  they satisfy certain efficiency and distributive conditions established in Art. 85.3. For that reason, we 
must distinguish between agreements having a negative~  effect on competition -i.e. that restrict 
competition in the sense of Art.  85.1, and which may or may not be exemptable-, and those having a 
negative ug_impact on competition, if besides having a negative direct effect they are not exemptable. 
In other words, the first concept would correspond to agreements falling under Art. 85.1  but exemptable 
under 85(3) and the second one would refer to those cases falling under Art.  85.1  mld not meeting the 
requirements for an individual or group exemption. 
Furthermore, the economic interpretation of Art. 85 requires providing an economic meaning to 
the concept of competition or more exactly, to the idea of restriction of competition. It seems evident 
that the legal concept of competition does not coincide with the assumptions underlying the economic 
model of perfect competition. But if we leave aside the model of perfect competition, there is not an 
alternative clear economic definition of  competition. Demsetz (1982) and more recently Vickers (1995) 
show this quite clearly.  Fortunately for  our purposes,  what we  need here  is  not a full  definition of 
"competition" as such, but some economic equivalent to the legal term "restriction of competition" to 
be able to identify cases or situatio~s falling under the prohibition of Art.  85.1  and 2.  This is  a more 
simple problem. 
1  0  This  measure  is  a  valid  measure  of  consumer  welfare  if  consumers  have  a  constant 
marginal utility of income -- in that case,  consumer surplus is  a monetary equivalent of consumer 
indirect  utility, that is,  of the  maximal  utility consumers  can  get given  the  prices  they  face.  If 
consumers do not have constant marginal utility of income, consumer surplus still reflects changes 
in consumers' utility for small evolutions of competitive equilibria. 
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Taking  into  account the  full  text of Art.  85,  we  will  identify here  below the  existence of a 
restriction of competition in economic terms, whenever the agreement or contract under consideration 
has at least one of  the two following effects: 
- Firstly, when  it  leads to a market outcome which takes us  away from  the  perfect competition 
outcome and bring us closer to the perfectly collusive outcome or 
- Consumers are worse off  as a result of  the agreement. 
In  other words,  any  reduction  in  social  welfare  as  measured  by  the  sum  of consumers  and 
producers surplus can be  considered-from an economic point of view as  a restriction of competition. 
This seems to be an easily justifiable interpretation of the concept restriction of  competition bearing in 
mind  the  fundamental  theorems  of welfare  Economics.  .  However,  the  practice  and  the  legal 
interpretation  of European  competition  rules  suggests  a  broader meaning  of this  concept.  For this 
reason, even if  total welfare increases, we will still accept that there is a restriction of competition if the 
agreement reduces consumer surplus only. This interpretation of  the concept is suggested by the text of 
Art.  85.3 .,  where consumer surplus is given particular importance.  We  interpret this as  an  indication 
that  the  legislator  has  a  concept  of social  welfare  different  from  the  standard  simple  addition  of 
consumers and producers surplus. According to this interpretation, social welfare increases whenever 
the addition of  consumers and producers surplus increases, subject to the restrain that consumer surplus 
remains, at  least the same. II Although this concept is  not the usual found  in  economic theory,  it  is 
perfectly consistent with  economic analysis and  can be  workable concept for the application of the 
results of  economic literature. 
We should recall here that for the assessment of the economic impact of vertical restraints on 
competition,  we  have  to  take  into  account  the  impact  of the  restraint  on  the  two  markets  usually 
involved in the "vertical structure", i.e. the market where retailers of one or different brands compete 
against each other and the market in which producers compete against each other for the purchases of 
downstream  retailers.  Following the  traditionally  strict  interpretation  of article  85  (1)  in  European 
competition  law,  we  will  assume  that there  is  a restriction of competition whenever competition  is 
restricted in the sense explained above in any or both of  these markets. 
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that the economic analysis of vertical restraints requires a 
much less detailed typology than the  legal analyis of the same topic.  Although a distinction may be 
sensible from  a legal perspective, the economic analysis of exclusive territories is basically the same 
whether it refers to pharmacies competing in a certain neighbourhood or to companies operating in a 
national territory.  Moreover, the economic analysis of vertical restraints concerning certain specific 
issues  such  as  minimum  purchasing  obligations  do  not  require  an  economic  analysis  particularly 
devised for this type of economic context. For these reasons, the spectrum of issues analysed below is 
necessrily more restricted than a legal analysis of vertical restraints would require.  There is just one 
exception to this: the case of vertical restraints in the context of international trade. The allocation of 
exclusive territories or exclusive dealing clauses for instance require an special treatment in the context 
of international trade and economic integration. These issues will be dealt with in a different paper that 
will  be  exclusively dedicated to the  relationship of market integration and vertical restraints  in  the 
Euorpean context. Only in  the section dealing with entry consideration we  will occasionally refer to 
those problems here. 
11  We  are  fully aware that the concept of "restriction of competition"  as  presented  in  Art. 
85.1.  is  not equivalent to the  "balance"  of efficiency and  distributional effects established  as  a 
requirement for the application of an  exemption to the prohibition.  However, we understand the 
importance  given  by  Art.  85.3.  to  consumer  surplus  as  an  indication  that  for  the  European 
legislator, one  ECU  of consumer surplus is  not equivalent to one  ECU  of producers surplus.  The 
practice of European competition rules seems to point out in the same direction too. IV.  ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
In this section we discuss types of vertical restraints presented in section II  above,  but paying 
attention  now  to  their  possible  origin,  object  and  economic  effects.  We  will  use  the  following 
framework. One or several producers use  retail networks to distribute their goods (in some instances, 
the  distribution  network  upon  consideration  may  be  wholesale  networks  as  well.)  For the  sake  of 
presentation, and  following in  that matter the quasi-totality of the  literature on  that subject, we  will 
consider the producer and its retail network as a unique vertical structure; we  will first focus  on  the 
internal organization of such a vertical structure, and then analyze the interaction between several of 
them. This approach is not totally neutral. In particular, it tends to identify the "brand name" of a good 
with its producer rather than its distributor. But in many countries there now exist "retail brand names" 
or "distribution trademarks",  whereby  a  large  retail  network  uses  its  own  name  for  (some  of)  the 
products he carries on, using, one or several producers as subcontractors. We will come back to that 
issue in  Section III and, for the moment, will suppose that the brand name of a product offered by a 
vertical structure  is  attached to the  corresponding manufacturer;  intra-brand  competition will  thus 
refer to competition between retailers offering the  product of a given  manufacturer,  within  a given 
vertical  structure,  whereas  inter-brand  competition  will  refer  to  the  interaction  between  vertical 
structures. 
We will assume that, within a given vertical structure, the producer can offer its retailers one or 
several vertical restraints. As we will see, each vertical restraint or combination of vertical restraints 
can correspond to several distinct motives, and several (combinations ot) vertical restraints can be used 
for a same purpose. Moreover, some motives do call for the joint use of several restraints. Hence, rather 
than analyzing in sequence the effects of each restraint, we will organize our presentation according to 
the possible motives of  the firms using them. For each motive, we will first examine which restraints or 
combinations of  restraints can be desirable for the firms, and then analyze the consequences of vertical 
restraints on economic welfare, when used for that motive. 
A first  line  of motives  corresponds to  co-ordination problems between the  producer and  the 
distributors; vertical restraints include a whole set of  tools which permit a better mutual control and, so 
doing, reduce the inefficiencies which could result from a bad co-ordination; consumers may gain from 
the reduction of  these inefficiencies (particularly if it decreases double marginalization problems, or if 
it eliminates free-rider problems in the provision of customers services), but may as well be worse off 
(e.g., if it adversely affects the level of  quality or differentiation). 
A  second  line  of  motives  relates  to  the  impact  of vertical  restraints  upon  inter-brand 
competition; precisely because vertical restraints affect the coordination between  a producer and  its 
retailers, they also affect the overall behaviour of  these firms, thereby affecting the interaction between 
vertical structures. We will first address this issue in a short-run perspective, and then in  a long-term 
perspective. 
1.  Vertical coordination 
This theme is the most frequently analyzed  in  the economic literature.  The emphasis  is  there 
placed on coordination problems between a producer and its retailers, within a given vertical structure, 
rather than on the interaction with other vertical structures. Hence, most of contributions consider the 
case of a unique producer, dealing with either one or several retailers.  The insights would of course 
apply as well to situations where several vertical structures are competing, taking as  given the attitude 
of rival structures, and neglecting strategic motives. In other words, this section can be  interpreted as 
the partial analysis of internal coordination problems, ignoring strategic considerations regarding the 
interaction between competing vertical structures. 
Each vertical structure, considered as a whole, faces a number of decision variables: wholesale 
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and retail  prices,  franchise  fees,  quantity purchased  by the  distributors,  quantity eventually sold to 
customers,  selling efforts,  distributors'  locations,  etc.  Neither the producer nor the distributors can 
directly  control  all  these  variables:  some  are  controlled  by  the  producer  only,  while  others  are 
monitored only by the distributors. Also, some decisions only affect the sharing of  the pie, while others 
directly affect the total surplus of the vertical structure. The second type of decision variables are the 
"targets" that determine the total profits of  the vertical structure. The decentralization of  these decisions 
generates externalities (since one firm's  decisions affect the other firms'  profits), which  in  tum can 
cause inefficiencies if they are not correctly taken into account.  It is thus natural for the partners to 
look for some means of  co-ordination, and in that respect vertical restraints can help. 
We will not list here all types of externalities between upstream and downstream decisions, but 
will rather focus  on the two most frequently quoted,  and  see how adequately chosen provisions can 
correct them.  We will then discuss, in each case, the impact on consumer surplus and total welfare. 
a.  Retail  prices 
Double  marginalization has  been the  first  coordination problem  formally  analyzed (Spengler 
(1950)) and refers to situations where both producer and distributor enjoy some market power. In such 
situations, they each add a mark-up to their costs, resulting in a "double" mark-up and too high prices. 
The coordination problem comes from the fact that each firm, when setting its own price (the wholesale 
price for the producer, the retail price for the distributor), does not take into account the effect of this 
price  on  the  other firm's  profit.  For instance, when  considering an  increase  of the  retail  price, the 
distributor trades off increasing its margin against decreasing the quantity, but "forgets" that reducing 
the quantity also adversely affects the producer's profit. Such externality is likely to lead to a final price 
above the level which would maximize the aggregate profits of  both the producer and the distributor. 
Firms can use various provisions to solve this coordination problem. The most obvious solution 
consists in "dictating" the retail price through resale price maintenance (a price ceiling would actually 
suffice here) and  to  set the wholesale price so  as  to  achieve the desired sharing of the profits. This 
however will only be feasible if in case of  disagreement the manufacturer and the court can observe the 
effective retail price. Alternatively, the producer can monitor the quantity sold by the retailer: imposing 
a minimal quota is here equivalent  to a price ceiling. 
If retail  prices either are  not  verifiable  or too  costly to  verify,  alternative  solutions  include 
nonlinear  tariffs.  Minimal  quotas  on  quantities  bought  (an  extreme  form  of nonlinear  tariff),  for 
example, may be a good substitute for minimal quotas on sales. Smoother tariff, such as  simple two-
part tariffs (a wholesale price plus a franchise fee) could also be as effective: the franchise fee can then 
be used to distribute the profits between the producer and the distributor, eliminating to  introduce a 
mark-up in the wholesale price which can be kept to the level of  the marginal cost. 
Yet another solution consists in introducing a strong intra-brand competition among distributors,  . 
thereby eliminating the double marginalization problem through a reduction of  the retail mark-up. 
Different restraints (resale price maintenance, quantity quotas, or nonlinear tariffs) thus allow a 
manufacturer and its distributors to solve the double marginalization problem. These vertical restraints 
hence appear as substitute instruments for a better efficiency. It should be stressed that, since double 
marginalization problems generate too high prices, any vertical restraint used for the sole purpose of 
eliminating this  problem  actually  leads  to  lower  prices,  and  thus  benefits  both  the  firms  and  the 
consumers --and thus, a fortiori, increases total surplus. Article 85( 1) should thus not apply to practices 
that are  solely  used  for  that  purpose.  (As  we  will  see,  however,  a  same  restraint can  be  used  for 
different purposes, some of  which being less desirable from consumers' perspective.) 
Arrangements such as two-part tariffs and resale price maintenance, that appear as subtitutes in 
the above analysis, make however very different uses of  distributors' possible better knowledge of local particularities of  cost  and demand conditions. Setting an upper bound on the retail price, for example, 
will not allow the distributor to adjust its price to positive shocks on cost and demand. 
Setting a wholesale price just equal to the marginal cost of production and using a franchise fee 
to recover the profits, in constrast, let the distributor free to adjust its retail price. It moreover gives the 
distributor the right incentives, by making it the residual claimant of joint profits:  at the margin, the 
distributor perceives all changes in total profits caused by a change in the retail price; the distributor 
will thus always choose the retail price that maximizes joint profits.  Whenever the distributor has a 
better knowledge of  the final demand or retail cost, two-part tariffs will thus generate better retail prices 
(from  the  point  of view  of joint profits)  than  resale  price  maintenance.  Note,  however,  that  the 
manufacturer's lack of information also limit its ability to correctly set the terms of two-part tariffs. In 
particular, making the distributor the residual claimant of  joint profits, also 'makes the distributor bear 
all the risks associated with shocks on demand and retail costs. Hence, setting the franchise fee  at an 
"average" level of the expected profits may not be accepted by risk-averse distributors, and may also 
lead the manufacturer to  loose  profitable markets adversely affected by  such  shocks on  demand  or 
costs. The manufacturer may then have to lower the amount of  the franchise fee, and may prefer to rely 
again on the wholesale price (at least partially) to recover part of  the profits --and thus two-part tariffs 
do not solve totally double marginalization problems. 
b.  Distributors' services 
Distributors  provide  a  range  of services  that  affect the  demand  for  the  goods  that they  are 
offering:  whether these efforts consist in  providing free  delivery, pre-sale information and advice to 
potential customers, in  increasing the number of salespersons or cashiers to reduce waiting times,  in 
enhancing the  organization of shelves  or offering a  bigger  show-room,  after-sale  services,  parking 
facilities,  etc.,  all  these  services  tend  to  attract  more  consumers  and  may  play  a  key  role  in  the 
marketing success of  some products. 
These efforts generate both vertical externalities, between the manufacturer and its distributors, 
and  horizontal  externalities  between  distributors.  An  important  distinction  lies  in  the  degree  of 
appropriability of  these efforts, both by the providers and by other actors (manufacturer, distributors) in 
the same vertical structure:  giving pre-sale advice can  for  example give  rise to  free-rider problems, 
whereas an increase in the number of  cashiers is unlikely to benefit other distributors. The existence of 
vertical or horizontal externalities prevents a distributor from getting the full benefits from the services 
it provides and results in fine in an underprovision of such services. We analyze this issue first in the 
context of a unique distributor (thus focusing on vertical externalities) and then in a multi-distributors 
context. 
i.  The single-distributor case 
In the absence of  any specific contract, when choosing its level of  effort the distributor considers 
its own profits, not aggregate profits. But if the manufacturer sets its wholesale price at a higher level 
than its marginal cost (which will typically be the case in the absence of  any specific contract), he gains 
from  any  increase  in  the  final  demand  resulting  from  the  distributor's  higher  efforts.  Hence  the 
distributor,  by not taking this increase of the upstream profits,  is  likely not only to charge too high 
prices, but also to provide too little effort.12 
12  This intuition is only correct caeteris paribus.  That is,  the distributor is  induced to charge 
too  high  a  price,  gjyJm  the  level  of  effort  provided,  and  too  little  effort gjyJm  the  price  being 
charged.  Because  of  cross  effects  (charging  a  higher  price  may  for  example  encourage  the 
distributor to  provide  more  effort),  however,  the  comparison  between  the  price  and  effort that 
would maximize joint profits, on the one hand, and those actually chosen by the distributor when 
facing a wholesale price above cost, on the other hand, is less clear. 
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To  solve this double coordination problem, the manufacturer can first  choose to  monitor the 
distributor's behavior,  for  example by  both  setting a price  ceiling and  requiring a minimal  level  of 
effort. If  this is not feasible, for example if  the distributor's effort is not observable or verifiable by third 
parties, then a two-part tariff can be as effective: charging a wholesale price equal to the marginal cost 
of production makes as before the distributor the residual claimant of the joint profits of the vertical 
structure, and thus leads the distributor to choose both the level of effort and the price that maximize 
these joint profits. The franchise fee  can then be adjusted so as  to achieve the desired sharing of the 
profits. 
Note that firms and consumers may disagree on the optimal amount of effort or retail services 
or, more precisely, on the right mix between retail services and prices. An increase in the level of  effort 
(together with an  increase in  the retail price) may well increase profits and at the same time reduce 
consumer  surplus  and  even  total  welfare:  the  reason  is  that  firms  are  interested  in  the  additional 
consumers  they  can  attract .through  such  effort  increase  (that  is,  they  are  interested  in  marginal 
consumers), and thus tend to neglect the impact of their decisions on infra-marginal consumers. If for 
example marginal consumers are willing to  pay more to  benefit from  more  services whereas  infra-
marginal consumers would prefer to have lower services and prices, than it may be in the joint interest 
of the  manufacturer and of the distributor to  increase the  level  of effort (and the  retail  price)  even 
though this hurts the majority of consumers and decreases total welfare. This divergence between the 
objectives of the firms and the objective of the consumers is  likely to be  important when the vertical 
structure  enjoys  a  substantial  market power.  When  it  is  the  case,  restraints that allow the  firms  to 
achieve  a  better coordination  in  the  choice  of effort  and  price  may  actually  lead  to  a  decrease  in 
consumer surplus, and may even reduce total surplus if the divergence is strong enough. In contrast, if 
consumers have replacement solutions increasing retail efforts and prices is unlikely to hurt consumers 
since  most of those that could be  hurt would  instead tum to  their alternate  solutions.  In  that case, 
restraints  used  by  the  manufacturer  and  the  distributor  for  the  sole  purpose  of achieving  a  better 
coordination on retail prices and services are likely to also benefit consumers, and thus, a fortiori, to 
increase total surplus. 
ii.  Intra-brand competition among distributors 
In contrast with the  pure case of double marginalization,  introducing intra-brand competition 
between distributors does not solve the double coordination problem, but only changes its nature. The 
reason  is  that,  as  already mentioned, the  firms'  optimal trade-off between retail  prices  and  services 
usually  differs  from  the  consumers'  most  desired  one,  and  intra-brand  competition  pushes  the 
distributors towards the consumers' best choices. In other words, intra-brand competition eliminates as 
before the retail mark-up (which is  good both for the manufacturer and consumers), but at the same 
time,  it  induces  distributors  to  follow  more  consumers'  preferences  when  resolving  the  trade-off 
between  retail  services  and  effort  (which  seems  good  for  consumers,  but  maybe  not  for  the 
manufacturer).  As  a result,  the  situation eventually prevailing will  generally fail  to  maximize joint 
profits. However, from the welfare point of view, this situation may actually be,  depending upon the 
circumstances, either better of worse than the joint-profit maximization  si~uation (see Scherer (1983), 
Comanor (1985) and Caillaud-Rey (1987)): the reason there is that although  intra-brand competition 
leads  distributors  to  follow  closely  consumers'  preferences,  it  also  induces  a  reaction  from  the 
manufacturer, who will set the wholesale price so as to maximize its own profits; and the indirect effect 
of downstream  intra-brand  competition  on  the  upstream  price,  i.e.  the  change  it  induces  on  the 
manufacturer's behavior, may more than offset the benefits from distributors' better care for consumer 
preferences. 
Here  again  the  manufacturer  can  achieve joint-profit maximization  through  various  vertical 
restraints,  for  example  by  directly  monitoring  both  prices  and  levels  of services.  Resale  price 
maintenance,  this  time  in  the  form  of price  floors,  is  actually  sufficient,  since  (together  with  the 
determination of  the wholesale price) it allows the manufacturer to control not only the retail price, but (3) 
also the retail margin. The retail price being fixed, intra-brand competition will then induce distributors 
to offer as much services as compatible with the margin set by the manufactuer: setting the retail price 
to the Goint) profit-maximizing level and a leaving a retail margin just sufficient to cover the costs of 
the  desired  level of services  will  thus  lead to the  best possible outcome for  the  manufacturer.  Yet 
another solution could consist in assigning an exclusive territory to each distributor and to use as above 
a two-part tariff, making the distributor the residual claimant of  the joint profits. 
iii.  Comments 
Several types of  vertical restraints again allow the manufacturer and the distributor(s) to achieve 
joint-profit maximization. However, and in sharp contrast with the case of  pure double marginalization, 
solving vertical coordination problems is not necessarily socially desirable, particularly if the vertical 
structure  enjoys  a  substantial  market  power,  in  which  case  the  divergence  between  the  marginal 
consumers' and the inframarginal consumers' willingness to pay for services may be important.l3 
When distributors' services are subject to free-riding, vertical restraints can still be used to get 
rid  of the  free-riding  problem  and  again  achieve  joint-profit  maximization  (see  for  example 
Mathewson-Winter (1984)). Moreover, in such situations, intra-brand competition among distributors is 
likely to generate too little effort, not only from the firms' point of view, but also from the consumers' 
point of view; hence in  such situations vertical restraints are likely to  be  both privately and socially 
desirable. 
c.  Other coordination problems 
A distributor usually distributes several goods at the same time. Hence if the wholesale price for 
one of the manufacturer's products is higher than the (marginal) cost of that product, a distributor may 
be  induced to favor the  sales  of another product.  From  the  point of view of the  vertical  structure, 
however, this introduces a distortion in  the mix of products and reduces total  profits. This distortion 
again vanishes  if the manufacturer uses  a two-part tariff of the  form  (franchise fee, wholesale price 
equal to marginal cost) or royalties fees (based on the total sales of all products), or through exclusive 
dealing arrangements (if  the other products are from a rival producer). 
Some of the manufacturers' choices also  indirectly affect their distributors'  profits:  this  is  for 
example certainly the case for decisions regarding either nation-wide advertising campaigns or product 
quality. There again, in the absence of specific arrangements a simple linear price is likely to generate 
vertical externalities and to fail to achieve joint-profit maximization whereas adequately chosen vertical 
restraints  can  correct  for  these  externalities  and  to  achieve  (or  to  get  closer  to)  joint-profit 
maximization. 
A related problem concerns profit-sharing. Future streams of profits are often uncertain in  the 
distribution business, particularly for goods that are either seasonal or subject to fashion.  As we have 
seen, several vertical coordination problem can be solved through the use of two-part tariffs, which in 
effect  make the distributors the residual claimants. This solution has thus also for effect to transfer all 
risks  to  the  distributors,  which  may  not  be  desirable  if distributors  are  risk-averse.  In  that  case, 
manufacturers may have to trade-off joint-profit maximization against efficient risk-sharing:  starting 
from  wholesale prices equal to  marginal costs,  an  increase  in  the  wholesale  prices (together with  a 
reduction of the franchise fee) generally induces distributors to depart from joint-profit maximization, 
but at the same time (at least partially) insures the distributors against the risks attached to these joint 
profits. 
13  See Winter (1993) for a detailed analysis of circumstances in which firms' and consumers' 
objectives  diverge,  in  a  situation  where  retailers'  efforts  aim  at  reducing  consumers'  shopping 
time. See also Marvei-McCafferty (  1984) and Klein-Murphy ( 1988). 
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Lastly,  distributors  must  sometimes  make  specific  investments,  particularly  in  the  case  of 
selective  distribution,  exclusive  distribution  or franchise  systems.  These  specific  investments  often 
have little residual value if the relationship is terminated. In that case, the return on such investments 
must be guaranteed through some long-term commitment: in the absence of  sufficient commitment, the 
fear  of opportunistic  behavior  would  likely  lead  to  underinvestment  (see  Williamson  (1985)  and 
(1989)).  Similarly,  manufacturers'  incentives to invest in  product quality and  fiability will  likely be 
insufficient if  distributors can "divert" some of  the attached rents. Various provisions can again be used 
to prevent such opportunistic behavior from one or the other party: exclusive territories can for example 
be granted to protect distributors' investments, while non-competition or exclusive dealing provisions 
can be used to protect a manufacturer's image and reputation.l4 
The  overall  conclusion  from  the  literature on vertical  coordination  problems  is  pretty  much 
similar to the one that can be drawn from the above analysis of  the distributors' choices of  effort: 
- In  all  cases,  a  simple  wholesale  price  fails  to  achieve  a  good  coordination  between  the 
manufacturer and its distributor(s), and thus to guarantee joint-profit maximization. 
- Various vertical restraints or combinations of  those can then be used to solve the coordination 
problem, or at least to get closer to joint-profit maximization. 
- These vertical restraints benefit the firms and raise their joint profits. They may also benefit 
consumers and thus  increase total welfare,  but they do  not always do  so.  In situations where inter-
brand  competition  is  weak  and  the  vertical  structure  thus  enjoys  a  substantial  market  power,  the 
theoretical analysis alone remains ambiguous regarding the welfare impact of vertical restraints, and a 
case-by-case  study  is  in  order.  In  contrast,  for  those  goods  that  are  subject  to  strong  inter-brand 
competition, any vertical  restraint that allow a manufacturer and  its  distributors to  achieve a better 
coordination not only increases their profits but is also likely to  increase consumer surplus and even 
more likely to enhance total welfare. 
2.  Inter-brand competition 
We have focused so far on "internal" coordination problems, within a given vertical structure. 
We now analyze the impact of vertical restraints on inter-brand competition, that is, on the interaction 
between competing vertical structures. We first study "short-term" or "static" effects, taking the overall 
structure (number and general characteristics of vertical structures present in the market) as given and 
keeping  it constant.  We  then consider "long-term" or "dynamic" effects of vertical restraints on the 
structure of  the market, including entry and exit. 
a.  Short-term analysis 
We focus here on the following type of issues: can vertical restraints be used to maintain or even 
amplify existing market power ? If yes, what conditions may 1avor such effects ? It has been argued 
that vertical restraints can be used either to help maintaining horizontal cartels or to exacerbate market 
imperfections (at either the upstream or the downstream level); we analyze these two effects in tum. 
14  Long-term  contracts may not suffice to induce efficient levels of investment, particularly 
when  it  is  difficult  to  forecast  all  future  contingencies  or  costly  to  write  a  fully  contingent 
contract.  For  an  analysis  of  these  issues  and  of  potential  underinvestment  effects,  see  Grout 
(  1984), Rogerson (  1984), Hart and Moore (  1988) and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey  (  1994). i.  Distribution cartels 
Since most vertical restraints eliminate or at least reduce downstream competition, wherever 
horizontal cartels are explicitly illegal downstream firms may use vertical restraints to circumvent the 
law  and  maintain  a  cartel  through  "sham  vertical  agreements"  with  a  pseudo  upstream  partner. 
Although this is a trivial misuse of  vertical restraints, likely to be banned in most countries, occasional 
examples still occur from time to time. IS 
ii.  Manufacturers' cartels 
It has sometimes been argued that vertical restraints can be used to help sustaining a cartel at the 
upstream  level.  For  example,  resale  price  maintenance  has  been  said  to  facilitate  tacit  collusion 
because: (i) it makes (retail) price cuts easier to detect (in the absence of resale price maintenance, a 
local divergence in the retail price may be due not only changes in the wholesale price, but also to local 
shocks on either the retail costs or the consumer demand); (ii) it also makes wholesale price cuts less 
desirable,  since  such a  price cut at the  upstream  level  could not,  supposedly,  be  passed  on  to  the 
downstream level. So far, however, none of  these arguments has been formally analyzed, accounting in 
particular for the possibility of hidden renegotiations between a manufacturer and its distributors on 
both retail and wholesale prices (see Telser (1960) and Posner (1977) for a discussion of  these issues). 
iii.  Competition dampening at the upstream level 
Even in the absence of inter-brand tacit collusion, vertical restraints used by a vertical structure 
may affect the  strategic  interaction  between  this  vertical  structure  and  rival  ones.  In  other words, 
because they directly affect the nature of  downstream intra-brand competition between distributors, and 
thus indirectly affect the behavior of the corresponding upstream manufacturer, vertical restraints alter 
the behavior of the entire vertical structure and thus affect inter-brand competition as well; vertical 
restraints can actually be used by a given vertical structure precisely to commit itself to behave in  a 
certain way vis-a-vis its rivals.  Several works have shown for example that vertical restraints such as 
exclusive territories, which reduce  intra-brand competition within a  given distribution network,  also 
reduce inter-brand competition between rival manufacturers, by reducing their incentives to undercut 
each other. 16 
Consider for example an oligopolistic market where several competing manufacturers distribute 
their products through distinct retail networks, and can either maintain a strong intra-brand competition 
within their retail network, or assign exclusive territories to each of  their distributors. If  a manufacturer 
opts for intra-brand competition then, assuming perfect Bertrand competition among distributors, the 
retail price will be equal to the wholesale price plus retail costs, and will thus fully react to any increase 
in the manufacturer's wholesale price. If instead the manufacturer assigns exclusive territories to  its 
15  One  recent  example  concerns  Swiss  bookstores.  In  Switzerland,  explicit  cartels  are 
tolerated but subject to supervision by two regulatory bodies:  one  in  charge of price control, the 
other in  charge of structural  issues.  German  books  sold  in  Switzerland  being  substantially  more 
expensive than on the other side of the border, the Swiss agency supervising cartel prices started 
to increase its pressures for lower prices. The bookstore cartel first tried to negotiate a moderate 
price decrease and then decided to change its structure, using a single intermediary - a Swiss law 
firm  - to  handle  all  trade  between  German  publishers  and  Swiss  bookstores  - and  resale  price 
maintenance as  part of their contract with the intermediary. 
16  See  for example Rey-Stiglitz (1985,  1995). A  similar idea  has  been formulated by Vickers 
(1985) and  further explored by Bonanno-Vickers (1988) to show that manufacturers may prefer, 
for  strategic  purposes,  to  delegate  the  marketing  of their  products to  independent  distributors. 
Related  ideas  have  been  developed  in  the marketing  literature  (see  for example  McGuire-Staelin 
(1983)),  while other contributions  have enriched  the delegation  model  (see  for example  Gal-Or 
(1991 )). 
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distributors,  they will  have  more  freedom  when  setting  their  prices:  but then,  if the  manufacturer 
increases the wholesale price for  its products, the retailers will have to trade-off between preserving 
their mark-ups (which would require to pass on the price increase to consumers) and preserving their 
market shares (against other manufacturers' products, which would require to absorb the price increase). 
As a result, retail prices will in general react only partially to the manufacturer's price increase (so that 
an  increase in the wholesale price will have a smaller effect than before on the final demand for the 
manufacturer's products).  But,  more  importantly, the  retail  price of the manufacturer's products will 
also  positively react to increases  in  the rivals' prices:  when  facing  a weaker competition from  rival 
products and thus a higher residual demand for their own products, retailers will typically respond by 
raising their own prices. In other words, reducing intra-brand competition, through the use of  exclusive 
territories, not only makes the demand perceived by the manufacturer less sensitive (i.e., less elastic) to 
its own wholesale price (which tends to  generate higher wholesale prices), but it also encourages the 
manufacturer's rivals to increase their own prices. (In effect, decreasing intra-brand competition allows 
the manufacturer to commit itself to a friendlier behaviour, to induce higher prices from the rivals.) 
Hence,  assigning  exclusive  territories  not  only  affect  intra-brand  competition  (among 
distributors offering the same product), but also inter-brand competition (among rival manufacturers or 
rival vertical structures). This argument does not assert that all the vertical restraints that limit intra-
brand competition always facilitate manufacturers' collusion. But it tends to  suggest that,  in  markets 
where  inter-brand  competition  is  initially  imperfect,  vertical  restraints  can  exacerbate  existing 
imperfections and reduce further the degree of inter-brand competition. I? Also, all vertical restraints 
may not lead to such competition-dampening effects. Since the key idea is to use vertical restraints to 
commit  oneself to  behave  in  a  certain  way  vis-a-vis  rivals,  such  effect  can  only  be  achieved  by 
"delegating"  some  decision  power  to  distributors:  in  the  previous  example,  for  instance,  granting 
exclusive territories gave more freedom to distributors in the choice of  their final prices (in the absence 
of exclusive territories, retail prices were simply equal to the sum of the manufacturer's price and of 
retails  costs).  Vertical  restraints  such  as  resale  price  maintenance,  which  increase  manufacturers' 
control of their distributors, hence could not be  used for that purpose (in the previous example, using 
resale price maintenance would lead to exactly the same situation as the one that prevails with a strong 
intra-brand competition - that is,  a direct confrontation between the two  manufacturers;  if moreover 
intra-brand competition is  imperfect - e.g., because retailers are differentiated by their location - then 
resale price maintenance would lead to a fiercer inter-brand competition). 
b.  Long-term analysis 
In the long run,  vertical restraints can also affect the number and characteristics of the active 
firms  in  the  market,  both  in  the  upstream  and  the  downstream  stages  of the  market.  We  will  here 
distinguish two types of effects:  (i) pro-competitive effects, which mainly relate to the  incentives to 
enter a market, and: (ii) anti-competitive effects, which essentially relate to entry barriers. 
i.  Entry stimulation 
So far the discussion has stressed that vertical restraints can increase existing manufacturers' and 
distributors'  profits,  either  by  enhancing  vertical  coordination  between  a  manufacturer  and  its 
distributors --in which case they may also benefit consumers-- or by maintaining horizontal upstream or 
downstream cartels, or by simply reducing even further imperfections in  inter-brand competition --in 
which case they increase profits but reduce, in the short run, consumer surplus and total welfare. But 
these  positive  effects  of vertical  restraints  on  incumbents'  profits  mean  that,  in  a  longer-term 
17  The  distortions  induced  by  the  introduction  of  exclusive  territories  or  other  types  of 
restraints are likely to become become negligible in the case of strong upstream competition (e.g., 
if there exist several close substitutes). 19 
perspective, potential entrants can anticipate larger profits and thus  have higher incentives to enter a 
market. 
Hence, vertical restraints can favor entry (both at the upstream and the downstream levels) and, 
by the same token, promote economic efficiency. These beneficial effects are likely to be particularly 
important if,  in the absence of vertical restraints,  free-rider problems and the fear of other kinds of 
opportunistic behavior would excessively limit the incentives for specific investments (to some extent, 
the entry decision can itself be assimilated to a "specific" investment). Also, vertical restraints may be 
particularly useful to a firm who, being already established in one country, wishes to expand and enter 
the market in other countries. 
Note  however that these  long-run  beneficial  effects  exist,  whether the  expected  increase  in 
profits  comes  from  enhanced  vertical  coordination  and  better  efficiency,  or  from  collusion 
sustainability  or  short-term  competition-dampening  effects.  If  vertical  restraints  are  primarily 
efficiency-enhancing, then both short-run and  long-run effects are  positive for  economic welfare.  In 
contrast, if vertical restraints are mainly used to reduce inter-brand competition in the short run, then 
their  overall  appreciation  must trade-off these  undesirable  short-run  (or  ex post) effects  with  the 
beneficial effects that they may have in the long run (or ex ante).18 
ii.  Market foreclosure and entry barriers 
In some circumstances, vertical restraints may be used to foreclose market access and prevent 
the  entry  of potential  efficient  competitors.  One  possible  strategy  might  be  to  sign-up  available 
distributors into exclusive dealing arrangements, thereby forcing potential new suppliers to set-up their 
own distribution systems. If  there are large economies of scope or scale in the distribution sector, these 
exclusive arrangements would raise the entry cost of  potential rivals: if for example the manufacturer is 
distributing  its  products  through  retailers  who  could  also  distribute  the  products  of a  potential 
competing manufacturer, and if there are synergies from distributing both lines of products, a potential 
competitor entering the market could have low retailing costs;  exclusive dealing provisions would rule 
this out and thus force a potential competitor to distribute its products in a less efficient way - and the 
increased distribution costs could deter entry. 
A similar entry barrier might be created if entry at the downstream level is difficult and costly, 
e.g. if there is a limited supply of retailers, at least of comparable quality, or a scarcity of comparably 
good retail locations. Then again, tying-up the best retailers or locations through long-term exclusive 
dealing provisions would increase distribution costs for newcomers and could thus rule out entry from a 
potential competitor.  (If entry requires  a minimal scale,  it might actually be  sufficient to  sign  up  a 
"minority block"). 
These  strategies  are  part of more  general  "raising  rivals'  costs  strategies"  which  have  been 
informally explored in the U.S.  institutional context by Krattenmaker-Salop (1986).  Such  strategies 
may be used against actual competitors, to force them out of  the market or at least substantially reduce 
their market share, as well as against potential ones, to prevent them to enter the market or at least to 
delay their entry. Exclusive agreements may of course hurt retailers (who may prefer to carry both lines 
of products, and may also eventually face increased competition if entry does occur), but they can be 
compensated for  this risk by a share of the extra profits generated so  long as  entry  is  successfully 
deterred. 
A formal analysis of these strategies has been proposed by Coman  or and Frech ( 1985) and then 
18  The  analysis  would  here  be  somewhat similar to the  analysis  of the  impact of  product 
market competition on  R&D,  growth and  development - see  the literature on  R&D  races  and  on 
endogenous  growth.  Aghion,  Dewatripont and  Rey  ( 1995)  stresses  that  (short-run)  competition 
can also have positive long-term effects by acting as  a discipline device on firms' behaviors. 20 
developed by Mathewson and Winter ( 1987) and Schwartz ( 1987), who have recognized the role of 
incumbent manufacturers' competition for distributors. More recently, Bernheim and Whinston (1992) 
have further extended the analysis by considering larger class of contracts (previous works had focused 
on  linear  wholesale  tariffs).  They  show  that  exclusive  contracts  can  again  be  used  to  foreclosure 
markets,  exce~t if vertical  arrangements  allow  upstream  and  downstream  firms  to  achieve  perfect 
coordination. I 
The role of exclusive provisions as  entry deterrent has  long been contested for the following 
reason:  even assuming that exclusive dealing provisions  can effectively deter the entry of potential 
manufacturers, why would distributors agree with such arrangements, thereby foregoing opportunities 
to deal with more efficient suppliers and to generate more competition among their suppliers ? A first 
answer  has  been  provided  by  Aghion  and  Bolton  ( 1987),  who  have  pointed  out  that  incumbent 
manufacturers can use part of  the extra profits so generated to "bribe" the distributors into the exclusive 
agreements.  In  Aghion  and  Bolton,  this  is  achieved  through  a  provision  for  liquidation  damages, 
according to which the distributor has to pay a certain amount to the incumbent manufacturer if it turns 
to an alternate supplier. Then, such potential alternate suppliers have to compensate the distributor, for 
at least the same amount, in order to effectively enter, so that the liquidation damages are eventually 
supported by the entrant. If the  entrant costs are  perfectly known to the  incumbents, then they can 
adjust the amount of the liquidation damages so as to extract the full surplus of the entrant, and entry 
will thus occur whenever the entrant is more efficient. However, if the entrant's cost and profitability 
are  uncertain,  then  the  amount  of liquidation  damages  will  be  optimally  set  at  an  average  level, 
resulting in  inefficient entry deterrence if the entrant's cost advantage is  not large enough:  entry will 
thus occur less often but, whenever it occurs, the joint profits of  the two incumbent firms will increase, 
through the liquidation damages eventually paid by the entrant. {This increase in the joint profits of  the 
two  incumbent firms  can  ex  ante  be  shared  between them through  an  adjustment of the  wholesale 
price.) 
More  recently,  Rasmusen,  Ramseyer  and  Wiley (1991)  and  Comanor and  Rey  (1994)  have 
shown  that exclusive  dealing  provisions  can  be  used  to  deter the  entry of more  efficient potential 
competitors, even in  the absence of "rent-extraction" from  these potential entrants. The argument of 
Rasmusen,  Ramseyer  and  Wiley  relies  on  a  poor  coordination  among  distributors  and  on  the 
assumption that entry must occur with  a minimal scale to be viable. They show that in  such a case 
incumbent suppliers can "bribe" a sufficiently large number of distributors into exclusive arrangements 
(ruling out viable entry) by sharing with them the extra rents that they can gain from dealing with the 
remaining distributors. Comanor and Rey's argument relies instead on the idea that the entry of a new 
competitor at one stage (either the upstream or the downstream stage) not only introduces or reinforces 
competition at that stage, but also triggers of  reinforces competition in the industry as a whole, and may 
thus  result  in  a  decrease  in  the joint profits  of the  incumbent  firms.  Whenever  this  is  the  case, 
incumbents have an incentive to prevent entry in order to protect their initial rents. 
Other types of vertical restraints can be used to deter entry. Generally speaking, and as already 
noted,  vertical restraints modify the partners'  attitude,  in  particular towards their competitors;  hence 
incumbent firms can for instance use these restraints to commit themselves to a tough attitude in the 
event of entry. For example,  it has been argued that long-term exclusive dealing provisions, which tie 
distributors to a given brand, induce then to engage in fiercer competition if  competing products appear. 
19  In  the  absence  of  agency  problems,  or  if vertical  contracts  can  circumvent  all  agency 
problems between a manufacturer and its distributors, then manufacturers' competition to sign up 
distributors into exclusive agreements  would result  in  having the most efficient supplier winning 
the competition, or no exclusive agreements if it is more efficient to have both producers as  active 
suppliers. If vertical contracts cannot eliminate all coordination/agency problems (e.g., if wholesale 
tariffs are restricted to linear pricing rules, generating double marginalization problems), then there 
is  room  for exclusionary effects and  manufacturers'  competition for distributors can  still  lead  to 
inefficient exclusive agreements. Similarly, exclusive territories may be used to induce a tougher response in the event of  geographically 
limited entry:  in  the  absence of such arrangements,  if a new competitor enters  in  a  given  area,  an 
already well-established manufacturer might be reluctant to engage in  a price war, which would also 
affect neighbours areas; in contrast, an independent retailer with an exclusive right on this particular 
area would not take into account the impact on the local price cut on neighbouring areas,  and thus 
would be likely to engage in a tougher competition with the local entrant (see Rey-Stiglitz (1985) for a 
formalization of  this idea). 
Of course,  all  these  effects  are  clearly  anticompettttve  and  thus  have  socially  inefficient 
consequences, particularly if  contracts cover a long period. 
Market foreclosure and entry deterrence are central issues in the contexts of development and 
international trade.  In the context of trade liberalization,  incumbents are  mainly domestic firms  and 
new-comers are more  likely to be of foreign  origin.  Removing tariff barriers may then  not be  very 
effective if incumbent domestic firms can use exclusive agreements to foreclose their markets and deter 
entry. A laxist competition policy may even serve, in that respect, as a non-tariff barrier. 
Similarly,  developing  countries  are  often  characterized  by  a  weak  inter-brand  competition, 
dominated by a few firms or cartels with strong market power. There again, these dominant actors can 
use  vertical  restraints  as  exclusionary weapons to  protect themselves  and  infringe  competition  and 
economic development, at the cost of  consumer welfare. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
This  analysis  shows  that  vertical  restraints  can  be  used  in  various  ways  to  increase 
manufacturers  and  distributors'  profits.  In  some  instances,  they  also  enhance  economic  efficiency, 
consumer surplus and thus total welfare whereas in other instances, they may hurt consumers and even 
reduce total welfare. We now derive the policy implications of  this analysis. 
The first lesson that can be drawn is  that the nature of a restraint does not allow by itself to 
predict whether it will always have nice or bad effects on economic efficiency and welfare: indeed, a 
same restriction can be desirable in some cases and undesirable in other cases, depending on the context 
and the needs that it fulfills,  or contribute to fulfill.  Resale price maintenance, for example, may be 
beneficial  to  consumers  if,  by  setting  a  price  ceiling,  it  is  used  to  avoid  double  marginalization 
problems. Price floors  can also have desirable consequences if used to fight free-rider problems.  In 
contrast, if resale price maintenance is primarily used to facilitate horizontal tacit collusion, then it will 
certainly  be  socially  undesirable.  Likewise,  exclusive  territories  can  also  contribute  to  economic 
efficiency if used to fight free-rider problems, but can have a negative impact on social welfare if they 
are mostly assigned to reduce inter-brand competition between incumbent producers or to prevent entry 
of  more efficient potential suppliers. 
Different vertical restraints can moreover constitute alternate and equivalent solutions to a given 
problem,  and  still  have  quite  opposite  properties  in  other contexts.  Resale  price  maintenance  and 
territorial protection, for example, can both be used as an effective instrument to fight free-riding, but 
the  former  can  also  be  used  to  fight  double  marginalization  problems,  whereas  the  latter  only 
exacerbate such problems. 
The above analysis shows that the per se legality (or illegality) of a given restraint cannot be 
justified on the grounds that this restraint is always good or always bad. (Per se rules may however be 
desirable if for example they significantly reduce transaction cost and legal uncertainty, as compared 
with a case-by-case treatment by courts or competition authorities). However, this analysis does not 
simply stress the complexity of  the evaluation of  the effects of  vertical restraints; it also identifies a few 
general ideas that may provide a basis for more specific guidelines. We first stress the role of inter-
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brand  competition,  and  then  focus  on  four  common  types  of vertical  restraints:  resale  pnce 
maintenance, exclusive territories, exclusive agreements and tie-ins. 
1.  Inter-brand versus intra-brand competition 
Most  of the  harmful  effects  of vertical  restraints  that  have  been  discussed  above  critically 
depend  on  the  structure  of the  market  and  more  particularly  on  the  degree  of competition  at  the 
upstream and downstream stages of the market. When inter-brand competition is  strong, that is, when 
there  is  strong  competition  between  independent  manufacturer-distributor(  s)  structures,  vertical 
restraints are less likely to reduce this competition, and even if they do they will only have a limited 
effect. Similarly, in  markets with strong inter-brand competition, decisions that maximize profits are 
likely to increase also consumer surplus and overall economic efficiency. 
Consider first the vertical coordination arguments, concerning intra-brand relationships between 
a manufacturer and its distributor(s) within a given vertical structure.  For each coordination problem, 
the  structure  analysis  is  the  same:  in  the  absence  of any  specific  arrangement  or vertical  restraint, 
simple  linear tariffs  lead  firms  to  adopt  decisions that do  not maximize their joint profits;  various 
vertical restraints or combination of those can then restore joint profit maximization, and achieve the 
desired  sharing of that pie.  Hence, to  evaluate the  impact of vertical restraints,  it  suffices to  assess 
whether joint profit maximization also generates a higher consumer surplus or at least a higher total 
surplus, as compared with the initial situation of poorer vertical coordination. If the vertical structure 
faces strong competition, then those decisions that increase the profits of  this structure are likely to also 
benefit consumers and thus total welfare. Consider for example the decisions regarding prices and the 
amount or nature of distribution services.  Enhancing coordination in  those decisions might  in  some 
instances  lead  to  increases  in  both  prices  and  services,  allowing  firms  to  increase  their  profits  by 
attracting  more  marginal  consumers,  while  at  the  same  time  hurting  other  consumers  and,  as  a 
consequence, reducing total welfare: this can occur when infra-marginal consumers are less interested 
in the additional services that are being provided, and would thus prefer to pay less for less services. 
However, this is more unlikely to occur in the case of strong inter-brand competition, since in that case 
those infra-marginal consumers will have alternatives close to what was initially offered by the vertical 
structure. 
Consider now the second line of argument, according to which vertical restraints might serve to 
facilitate  tacit collusion,  either at the  downstream  stage  (distribution  cartel)  or the  upstream  stage 
(production cartel) of  the market. Such a risk is again much lower in markets where many rival brands 
or vertical structures are active and offer close substitutes, or if entry is  relatively easy in  the market 
stage where collusion might otherwise occur. This risk seems for example rather small when vertical 
restraints are employed by a small manufacturer trying to  introduce his  products into a market with 
many existing, competing suppliers.20  Similarly, as already noted, the argument that vertical restraints 
might  be  used  to  reduce  inter-brand  competition  between  existing  verticul  structures  (competition-
dampening effects) build on  previously imperfect competition.  For example,  consider the  possibility 
that  manufacturers  try  to  reduce  inter-brand  competition  by  granting  exclusive  territories  to  their 
retailers. This may occur if so  doing reduces the elasticity of the demand perceived upstream. But if 
20  Even if all vertical structures adopt restraints to reach a better vertical coordination, there is 
little  threat  of  collusion  being  facilitated  in  markets  with  strong  competition  between  vertical 
structures.  Resale  price  maintenance  or  territorial  protection  may  for  example  allow  the 
distributors of a  given  brand  to coordinate the  retail  prices for that brand,  but this does not by 
itself imply collusion between competing brands. On the contrary, a better intra  brand coordination 
(even in prices) may in fact reinforces the competitiveness of the vertical structures present in the 
market, and thus benefit consumers and economic efficiency. (4) 
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inter-brand competition is  strong,  then  the  demand  perceived  by  the  manufacturers  would  be  very 
elastic in all cases: it would be so in the absence of  vertical restraints, since a unilateral increase in the 
price of  one brand would lead consumers to switch to competing brands, and would for the same reason 
remain high even if exclusive territories were used to  eliminate intra-brand competition.  Hence the 
possible strategic effect attached to the use of exclusive territories, which may still exist, is likely to be 
small.  Lastly, the argument that vertical restraints might reduce  efficiency by  increasing barriers to 
entry, and thus increase or preserve the exercise of market power, becomes also less convincing when 
the vertical structure faces  substantial competition from  other brands and retailers in  unconcentrated 
markets. 
In contrast, whenever inter-brand competition is weak, the impact of  vertical restraints becomes 
much more ambiguous: on the one hand, solving vertical coordination problems may increase the joint 
profits of  the manufacturer and its distributors, but at the expense of consumers and economic welfare; 
on the other hand, the risk becomes larger that some restraints might be used not to improve intra-brand 
coordination  but  rather to  facilitate  collusion,  either  downstream  (distribution  cartels)  or upstream 
(production cartels). Moreover, it may be very difficult to distinguish between these various possible 
effects (how could a court assess the impact of a joint increase in retail prices and services on  infra-
marginal consumers ?). 
Hence,  in  order  to  evaluate  the  effects  of vertical  restraints  on  economic  efficiency,  it  is 
necessary to  first  consider the structure of the supply both of upstream  manufacturers and of retail 
services:  do  manufacturers and retailers  supply sufficiently close  substitutes to prevent or limit the 
exercise of market power? What is the structure and competitiveness of upstream supply, and what is 
the structure and competitiveness of  the downstream supply of  retail services? Note that the analysis of 
the market might start with a look at the market share of the vertical structure under scrutiny, but this 
may not be enough.  In a concentrated market even the restraints used by a brand with a small share 
may contribute importantly to limit entry. As a somewhat unrealistic but illustrative example, suppose 
that all but one desirable retail location in each relevant area of the market is controlled (e.g., through 
ownership tie)  by  the  small  number of other upstream  suppliers  in  the  market;  then  if the  small 
manufacturer gains control of  the remaining locations, e.g. through exclusive dealing provisions, these 
restraints  may  prevent  any  potential  entrant  from  being  an  effective  competitor,  even  though  the 
restraints used by this particular manufacturer affect only a small share of the  market. 21  Thus the 
overall concentration of the market matters,  as  well as  the share of the  particular vertical  structure 
under scrutiny. 22 
We  now  tum to  the  policy  implications  for  resale  price  maintenance,  exclusive  territories, 
exclusive agreements and tie-ins. For each type of restraint, we will discuss the application of Article 
85  in the  lights of the effects presented above:  effects on vertical coordination (on prices and retail 
services), short-term effects on upstream and downstream competition, and long-term effects on  inter-
brand competition. 
21  A  potential entrant might however succeed by acquiring distribution rights from an existing 
supplier.  If the entrant is more efficient than existing suppliers, and if some existing ones are only 
marginally profitable, such a purchase could  be  mutually profitable.  See  Krattenmaker and  Salop 
(  1986) for a discussion of some of these issues. 
22  The  analysis  should  also  consider  the  dynamics  of  market  structure.  Is  the  market 
expanding rapidly -and  are  new suppliers succeeding - which would suggest that entry barriers are 
low ?  The positive effects of vertical restraints are  likely to be  greatest in such growing markets, 
particularly if used by new-comers. 24 
2.  Exclusive territories 
i.  Vertical coordination 
Coordination  problems  appear  in  many  price  and  nonprice  dimensions.  Regarding  price 
coordination,  the  main  issue  is  to  avoid  double  marginalization  problems.  But assigning  exclusive 
territories to distributors only reinforces such double marginalization problems, and thus one should not 
expect territorial restrictions to be used to fight such problems. If distributors have a large bargaining 
power over their suppliers, however, then they may insist in having territorial restrictions in order to 
accept to carry on a given manufacturer's products.  Such use of territorial restrictions may increase 
distributors'  profits,  but at the  expense  of consumer  surplus  and,  if their demand  is  elastic,  at the 
expense as well of the manufacturer. Article 85(1) should thus apply, and furthermore, such use could 
not be exempted under Artilce 85(3). 
Territorial  restrictions  may  however  have  desirale  effects  when  used  to  achieve  a  better 
coordination on retail services. In particular, for services such as pre-sale advice, retailers who attract 
consumers with a "no service, low price" strategy may free-ride on service providers. If  the provision of 
such services cannot be directly compensated by the manufacturer, then free-riding is likely to lead to 
underprovision of  these services, not only from the point of  view of  the firms, but also from the point of 
via consumers and of total welfare.  When this is  the case, it is  desirable to  encourage those vertical 
restraints that may eliminate or at least reduce the scope for  free-riding.  This  is  clearly the case of 
territorial restrictions (particularly in their strongest form), which ensure that service providers that they 
will keep their customers and thus get back the benefits (either in term of larger quantities sold or of 
higher prices) of  the services they offer.23 
Even in the absence of free-riding, a manufacturer may want to assign exclusive territories to 
better monitor retail services, and in particular, to favor those services that attract marginal consumers. 
However,  improving  coordination  then  does  not  necessarily  increase  consumer  surplus  and  total 
welfare. Article 85(1) may thus have to be applied, when territorial restrictions leads to situations which 
increase the manufacturers' and distributors'  profits  but reduce  consumer surplus.  Moreover, Article 
85(3)  cannot  be  applied  in  such  instances,  since  consumer  surplus  is  then  reduced.  In  contrast, 
whenever there  is  a  strong  inter-brand  competition,  it  is  likely  that  allowing  for  a  better  vertical 
coordination on retail prices and services benefit not only the firms, but consumers too. 
Lastly, let us mention that in some instances, rival firms may suffer from the use of territorial 
restrictions by a given vertical structure. This may be the case of free-riders,  but also of competing 
brands whose profits decrease. Even if this decrease in profits exceeds the gain in profits of the first 
structure and the increase in consumer surplus (in which case total surplus decreases and Article 85( 1) 
may apply), however, Article 85(3) should be called in. 
To  summarize  this  discussion,  exclusive  territories  should  fall  under  Article  85(1)  with  no 
exemption, whenever they only serve to maintain the  market power of large  distributors.  If instead 
coordination concerns more the adequate provision of retail  ~ ervices,  then territorial restrictions are 
desirable if the risk of free-riding is important and/or inter-brand competition is  strong, but has more 
ambiguously desirable properties otherwise. 
23  The fact that retail services are  potentially subject to free-riding does not by itself suffice 
to assert the desirability of vertical  restraints:  since vertical  restraints may also  have costs, their 
use must be  compared with other means of control of the provision of such services.  (In  France, 
for example,  Sony  did  not opt for  selective  or  exclusive  distribution  systems,  or other type  of 
vertical  restraint,  but instead  defined  a  catalog  of compensations  (in  the form of discounts)  for 
each type of relevant retail service (pre-sale advice, after-sale and repair service, etc.). 25 
ii.  Positive effects on inter-brand competition 
To  demonstrate  the  economic  efficiency  of exclusive  territories,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court 
emphasized in its Sylvania decision their desirable impacts on inter-brand competition in the long run: 
"Vertical  restrictions  reduce  intra-brand  competition  by  limiting  the  number of sellers  of a 
particular product competing for the business of  a given group ofbuyers  .... Vertical restrictions promote 
inter-brand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution 
of  his products.  These "redeeming virtues" are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions 
under the rule of  reason.  Economists have identified a number of  ways in which manufacturers can use 
such  restrictions  to  compete  more  effectively  against  other  manufacturers.  For  example,  new 
manufacturers  and  manufacturers  entering  new  markets  can  use  the  restrictions  in  order to  induce 
competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and  labor that is  often 
required in the distribution of  products unknown to the consumers". 24 
The  Court  thus  acknowledges  that  exclusive  territories  reduce  intra-brand  competition,  but 
advocates  for  a  rule  of reason  because  of the  possible  benefits  of these  restrictions  on  inter-brand 
competition.  This  is  consistent  with  the  previous  economic  analysis,  which  stresses  that  vertical 
restraints  can  encourage  entry  and  promote  inter-brand  competition  because,  by  allowing  greater 
efficiency to be achieved or even by merely facilitating rising profits in the short-run, they can attract 
more entrants. This argument may be  particularly important when large investments ·need to be made 
to enter the market 
iii.  Negative effects on inter-brand competition 
The  previous  discussion  has  identified  two  possible  types  of negative  effects  of vertical 
restraints on inter-brand competition, short-term ones and long-term ones. 
In the short run, vertical restraints can be used to facilitate horizontal collusion within existing 
cartels ("type A"  effects  in  the  following)  or to  dampen  inter-brand  competition  ("type  B") among 
rivals. In the long run, vertical restraints can be used by incumbent firms to deter entry, by committing 
themselves to a tougher response in the event of entry ("type C"  effects), or to foreclose markets by 
raising rivals' costs ("type D" effects). The last type of  effect is usually attached to long-term exclusive 
dealing provisions, so we will restrict attention here to effects of  type "A", "B" and "C". 
Regarding type "A"  effects, territorial restrictions could indeed be used to merely maintain a 
downstream cartel, and any such use should clearly fall under Article 85(1) with no exemption,. As for 
types "B" and "C", the logic is the same in the two cases: incumbent firms can use vertical restraints to 
alter their attitude, not only vis-a-vis their partners, within a given vertical structure, but also vis-a-vis 
current and potential competitors. Depending on the context, they may use these restraints to commit 
themselves to respond more cooperatively (in order to dampen competition with existing rivals) or, to 
the contrary, to respond more aggressively (to prevent the entry of  a potential competitor or to force an 
existing competitor out of the market). These effects thus rely on a strategic use of the delegation, to 
distributors, of  certain decisions (and particularly of  price decisions). 
We have mentioned two examples of such effects.  In the first example,  a manufacturer may 
prefer to assign exclusive territories to its distributors in order to give them more freedom in the setting 
of  their retail price (no longer dictated by intra-brand competition) and, by so doing, to make this retail 
for  its  own  products  responsive  to  rivals'  price  increases.  In  the  second  example,  an  established 
24  433 U.S. (1977} at 54-55. 26 
manufacturer assigns exclusive territories to independent retailers in  ord~r to commit himself to tougher 
price responses to geographically limited entry. In both instances, the negative impact on inter-brand 
competition builds on delegating the price decision to independent distributors, or on reinforcing these 
independent distributors' freedom in the choice of  their pricing policy. Article 85(1) should then apply, 
and no exemption should be granted under Article 85(3). 
iv.  Comments 
Territorial  restrictions  can  thus  benefit  consumers  in  various  ways.  It  may  help  new 
manufacturers to attract good distributors or foreign manufacturers to enter domestic markets, thereby 
fostering  entry and  increasing  inter-brand competition.  But it may also  improve the  efficiency with 
which existing manufacturers and distributors supply their products or services, particularly if inter-
brand competition is robust; increases in inter-brand competition need not thus be considered necessary 
to prove the efficiency benefits of  territorial restrictions. 
A strong inter-brand competition is a good indicator that the use of territorial restrictions be a 
partilular manufactuer is  likely to be efficiency-enhancing. This is in accordance with Justice White's 
concurring opinion  in the US Sylvania case, who argued for distinguishing the Sylvania case from the 
Schwinn case by pointing to differences in market shares:25 Sylvania had an insignificant market share 
((1  per cent to  2 per cent, whereas the dominant manufacturer had a 60 per cent to 70 per cent share) 
and "enjoyed no consumer preference that would allow its retailers to charge a premium over the other 
brands";  it  was  a  "faltering,  if not  failing"  producer of television  sets,  whereas  Schwinn  was  "the 
leading bicycle producer in the Nation", with a national market share of22.5 per cent. 
The evaluation of inter-brand competition,  should  however not focus  solely on the  levels of 
market shares at a given point in time; in particular, it should also take into account changes in market 
structure  over  time  -- important  changes  being  likely  to  indicate  a  stronger  form  of inter-brand 
competition.  The  Schwinn  decision has  been for  example much criticized on  the  ground  that while 
Schwinn's market share was 22.5 percent in 1951, its share had fallen to 12.8 per cent by 1961.26 
Note that efficiency-enhancing effects can be  attached to  strict as  well  as  to weak forms  of 
territorial protection. A weak form of restriction is illustrated by Sylvania's location restrictions, which 
required the retailer to sell from one particular place of business but left him free to sell to any type of 
customer,  including  discounters  and  other  non-franchised  dealers.  Schwinn's  customer  restrictions 
were  stricter,  since  they  prevented  franchised  dealers  from  selling  to  discounters  or  other  non-
franchised dealers.27 Stronger forms of ("absolute") territorial protection prevent retailers from selling 
to customers in other territories, while variants of "limited" or "passive" exclusive territories include 
restraints  that  allow  retailers  to  accept  orders  from  their  territory  but  prevent  them  from  active 
marketing, outside this territory.28 
25  Continental  TV  Inc.  v.  GTE  Sylvania,  433 U.S.  (1977).  '!'he  main  opm1on  however 
disagreed:  it found  the two cases  indistinguishable  and  replaced  Schwinn's per  se  treatment of 
territorial restrictions by the rule of reason approach. 
26  Neale and Goyder (1980, p.  285). 
27  In  Sylvania,  Justice  White  argued  for  a  distinction  based  on  the  strictness  of territorial 
restrictions and  urged for keeping  strict forms such as  Schwynn's restrictions per se illegal.  The 
main  opinion of the Court however in  Sylvania did  not follow and  decided for applying  a  rule  of 
reason to both types of restrictions. 
28  Even  when reselling  is formally allowed, however, retailers may implicitly agree  not to do 
so in order to maintain low intrabrand competition. In that case, the distinction between the types 
of  restrictions  illustrated  by  the  Sylvania  and  Schwynn  cases  is  more  limited.  Likewise,  the 
distinction  between  "absolute"  and  "limited"  territorial  protection  is  unclear  when  the 27 
The  distinction  between  absolute  and  passive  exclusive  territories  has  been  central  in  the 
European competition policy towards territorial restrictions.29 Although the Commission advocated in 
favor of limited location provisions (because they ensure retailers that their initial investments could be 
recovered, and give them incentives to  exert important efforts)  it also argued that stricter territorial 
restrictions would not qualify for  exemption under Article 85(3),  in  part  because they would  more 
completely eliminate intra-brand competition.  3D  This calls for two remarks. 
First, the above analysis shows that there is  no obvious economic argument for establishing a 
strict borderline between absolute and limited territorial restictions. Strong forms of protection may be 
temporarily  desirable  when  a  manufacturer  seeks  to  enter  a  new  market,  whereas  even  limited 
protection should be banned when used to facilitate collusion among long-established dominant firms. 
Even restricting attention to simple rules,  it is  not obvious that the distinction between absolute and 
limited rrotection may be favored against other simple rules, based on specified characteristics of the 
market.  1 
Second,  although  Article  85(3)  can  be  applied  only  if competition  is  not  eliminated  for  "a 
substantial part of the products in question", it does not necessarily imply that intra-brand competition 
must be preerved. Instead, the "products in question" may be interpreted as the market to which belong 
the manufacturer's goods. If there are many competing brands, eliminating intra-brand competition for 
one product need not imply a reduction of  competition in a substantial part of  the market. 
3.  Resale price maintenance 
Contrarily to nonprice restrictions (such as exclusive territories), which are tolerated, to some 
(variable) extent in most economically developed countries, resale price maintenance (and its related 
variants)  are  rather  unanimously  banned.  It is  striking  to  contrast this  difference  in  the  attitudes 
towards price and nonprice restraints with the findings of  the above economic analysis. In this analysis, 
both  types  of restraints  clearly  appear  to  have  both  positive  and  negative  impacts  on  economic 
efficiency, depending on the context and their purposes. In that respect, one can point out that most of 
the arguments that have been put forward in recent cases to justify territorial restrictions could be used, 
manufacturer assigns very large  territories,  thereby granting  his distributors a quite high  level  of 
intrabrand protection. 
29  The Commission stressed for example in its Pronuptia exemption decision that the location 
restriction  under  scrutiny did  not prevent  customers  from  choosing  where  to  buy the  goods  or 
franchisees from selling to each other. The distinction between "absolute" and  "limited" territorial 
protection  has  been  recalled  in  all  successive  franchise  cases  (Yves  Rocher,  Computerland, 
Service Master, CHarles Jourdan, ...  ) and is crucial in the franchise exemption regulation. 
30  The preambule of the franchise block exemption regulation states that "To guarantee that 
competition cannot be  eliminated for a substantial part of the goods which are  the subject of the 
franchise,  it  is  necessary  that  parallel  imports  remain  possible".  Article 5-g  also  asserts  that 
agreements cannot be  exempted  under  which  "the franchisees  are  obliged  not to supply  within 
the Common Market the goods or services  which are  the subject-matter of the franchise to end 
users  because  of their  place  of  residence".  As  a  consequence,  the  regulation  only  allows  the 
franchiser  to  commit  himself  not  to  compete  with  his  franchisees,  either  directly  or  indirectly 
(article  2-a.),  and  to require that franchisees should  not compete  "actively" in  other franchisees' 
territories (article 2-d.). 
31  Being  more  permissive  rules  for  small  firms  may  for  example  be  more  in  line  with  the 
economic analysis and  may also  decrease the delays and  costs associated with administrative or 
judicial procedures -- both being especially important for small firms. 28 
word for word, to justify as  well  resale price maintenance.  We  will show below that this is  in  for 
example the case of most of the arguments given by the U.S.  Supreme Court in  GTE Sylvania, the 
decision that started applying a rule of  reason (rather than per illegality) to territorial restrictions. 
Let us now review the potential roles of  resale price maintenance in the effects discussed above. 
It will be useful to distinguish between price floors and price ceilings. 
i.  Vertical coordination 
Price ceilings are very useful to fight double marginalization, whereas price floors cannot serve 
that purpose.  Since the  elimination of double  marginalization benefits  consumers  as  well  as  firms, 
Article 85( I) should thus not be applied to either resale price maintenance or price ceilings used to fight 
double  marginalization  problems.  Note  that  in  some  instances,  the  use  of price  ceilings  by  one 
manufacturer, which solve its double marginalization problem, may actually reduce the profits of rival 
firms.  Nevertheless,  even  in  such  instances  total  surplus  is  likely to  increase,  since  solving double 
marginalization problems only enhances inter-brand competition and  can only lead to  reduce  surpa-
competitive mark-ups and rents. (In other words, even if rivals' profits are hurt, this is only due to the 
reduction of  elimination of supra-competitive rents, and the gain to consumers then exceeds the loss of 
profits).  Hence,  if solving  double  marginalization  was  the  only  possible  purpose  of resale  price 
maintenance or price ceilings, then one should favor the adoption of these restraints. Note that,  like 
territorial  restrictions,  distributors  enjoying a  large  market power may  insist  in  having  price  floors 
maintained before acepting to carry on one manufacturer's product. Article 85( I) should apply in such 
instances, and price floors should moreover not be exempted under Article 85(3) in those cases. 
Another argument in favor of  resale price maintenance, which applies this time to price floors, is 
that it prevents free-rider problems;  more generally,  resale price maintenance (either in  the form  of 
price ceilings or of  price floors) may help manufacturers and distributors to coordinate on the provision 
of retail services.  For services subject to  free-riding,  resale  price  maintenance,  in  the  form  of price 
fllors,  eliminates price competition but promotes nonprice competition and restores the incentives of 
service providers. As noted by Klein et Murphy ( I988), distributors may still favor services that are less 
subject to free-riding.  It nevertheless remains that resale price maintenance, when used to fight free-
riding, has desirable rather than undesirable effects. 
However, as for territorial restrictions, in the absence of  free-riding improving coordination does 
not necessarily increase consumer surplus and total welfare. Article 85(I) may thus again have to be 
applied, when resale price maintenance improves vertical coordination in retail prices and services but 
reduces consumer surplus. 
To  summarize this  discussion,  if vertical  coordination primarily concerns  prices,  then  resale 
price maintenance (in the form of  price ceilings) is desirable. If instead coordination concerns more the 
adequate provision of  retail services, then resale price maintenance (in the form of  price ceiling if intra-
brand competition is  weak and  in the form  of price floors  otherwise) is  desirable if the risk of free-
riding  is  important  and/or  inter-brand  competition  is  strong,  and  has  more  ambiguously  desirable 
properties otherwise. 32 
32  It is sometimes argued that resale  price maintenance may lead to inefficiencies because it 
will prevent differences in the retail costs of various distributors (whether these differences result 
from exogenous local differences, or from differences in the efficiency with which various retailers 
operate),  from  being  passed  on  as  differences in  retail  prices.  This  argument  however assumes 
that  the  manufacturer  imposes  a  uniform  resale  price,  while  in  principle  he  could  recognize 
differences in retail costs and  set different, cost-sensitive prices (and  would actually be  willing to 
do  so  in  order to maximize  profits).  Moreover,  if for some  reason  the  me:  ufacturer cannot  set 
cost-sensitive  prices,  and  resale  price  maintenance  would  cause  a  significant  inefficiency  and 29 
ii. Positive effects on inter-brand competition 
The argument that the same vertical restraints that limit intra-brand competition and increase 
incumbents' profits may also have a desirable impact in the long run on inter-brand competition is not 
limited to  non-price  vertical  restrictions:  price  restrictions,  too,  can  promote  entry  and  inter-brand 
competition by increasing the profitability, and perhaps also the efficiency, of  a new entrant. 
In Monsanto  v.  Spray Rite, the U.S.  Supreme Court has actually acknowledged that price and 
non-price vertical restraints can have very similar economic effects: 
"It is  precisely in  cases  in  which the manufacturer attempts to  further a particular marketing 
strategy by means of  agreements on often costly non-price restrictions that it will have the most interest 
in the distributors' resale prices.  The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn 
sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesmen or demonstrating 
the technical features of  the products, and will want to see that "free-riders" do not interfere".33 
Likewise, in Business Electronics v.  Electronics, the Court asserted: 
"  ... vertical restraints that do not result in dealer termination, such as the  initial granting of an 
exclusive territory or the requirement that certain services be provided, can be attacked as designed to 
allow  existing dealers  to  charge  higher prices .... We  cannot  avoid  this  difficulty  by  invalidating  as 
illegal per se only those agreements imposing vertical restraints that contain the word 'price', or that 
affect  the  'prices'  charged  by  dealers .... All  vertical  restraints,  including  the  exclusive  territory 
agreement held not to be per se illegal in GTE Sylvania, have the  ~otential to allow dealers to increase 
"prices" and can be characterized as intended to achieve just that".  4 
Nevertheless, the  Supreme Court went on and  maintained the  distinction between the per se 
illegality of price restraints and the rule  of reason applied to  non-price vertical  restraints.35  Yet it 
should be stressed that the argument used in the previous section to advocate for exclusive territories 
also applies, word for word, to resale price maintenance. 
reduce  joint profits,  then  resale  price  maintenance  will  simply  not be  used.  See  Rey  and  Tirole 
(  1986b) for an analysis of these issues. 
33  465  U.S. 752 (1984) at 762-3. 
34  485 U.S. 717 (1988) at 727-728. 
35  While  the  Court  recognized  that  upstream  producers  using  non-price  restrictions  will  be 
concerned  with  retail  prices,  and  non-price  restrictions  often  will  have  the  effect of  increasing 
retail  prices,  the Court was anxious both to protect the doctrine of GTE Sylvania that non-price 
restrictions be  judged under the rule of reason and to retain the  rule of per se illegality for vertical 
price  restrictions.  Thus it was necessary to establish  what was a  vertical  price  restriction  that 
was per se illegal,  and  what was a vertical non-price restriction  (that perhaps affected prices)  to 
be  judged  under the  rule  of  reason.  The  Monsanto  and  Sharp  decisions  both  addressed  this 
question;  the  per  se  rule  applies  only  if  there  is  clear  evidence  of  agreement  between 
manufacturer and distributor which "tends to exclude the possibility of independent action" by the 
two (Monsanto decision, 465 U.S. 752 (1984) at 768), and there is  agreement about the price or 
price levels, and not only an  agreement (e.g. on a non-price restriction) that might  affect price but 
did  not  establish  that  price  (Sharp  decision,  485  U.S.  717  (1988)  at  725-6).  See  the  recent 
discussion of th U.S. competition law and  policy towards vertical restraints in  OCDE  (1994), pp. 
190-191, as  well as the previous report from the FTC, Overstreet (1983). 30 
iii.  Negative effects on inter-brand competition 
We  focus  again  on  the three  types  of effects  ("A",  "B"  and  "C")  identified  in  the  previous 
section. Regarding type "A" effects, relative to the impact of vertical restraints on tacit collusion and 
cartels, resale price maintenance and price floors can first have a negative impact when simply used to 
maintain a distribution cartel. It has moreover been advocated that resale price maintenance could also 
be  used  to  facilitate  upstream  tacit  collusion,  by  reducing  the  manufacturers'  incentives  to  lower 
wholesale prices. However, as  already noted,  so  far this argument lacks a rigorous treatment, taking 
into account the possibility of (possibly) hidden renegotiations of retail as well as wholesale prices, as 
well as empirical evidence. 
In the short run, vertical restraints can be used to dampen inter-brand competition ("type B  ") 
among rivals.  In the  long  run,  vertical restraints can be  used by incumbent firms  to  deter entry,  by 
committing themselves to a tougher response in the event of  entry ("type C" effects). As already noted, 
in the two cases the effects rely on a strategic use of the delegation of price decisions to distributors. 
Such  effects  can  thus  be  attached  to  restraints  such  as  exclusive  territories,  which  indeed  gives 
distributors more  freedom  in  the  setting of their prices,  but not to  resale  price maintenance,  which 
precisely rules out any freedom in the distributors' choices of prices. (Resale price maintenance can to 
some extent be seen as the exact contrary of  price delegation). Hence, from the standpoint of  these two 
types  of effects  ("B"  and  "C"),  competition  authorities  should  be  less  favorable  towards  territorial 
restrictions than towards price restrictions. 
4.  Exclusive agreements 
Exclusive agreements encompass both restrictions  on the  manufacturer (when the agreement 
gives an exclusive right to a given distributor) and restrictions on the distributor (when the agreement 
restricts  the  distributor  from  dealing  with  competing  products).  Since  the  first  type  of restriction 
resembles territoriral restrictions (the "territory" being the entire country, when for example a foreign 
manufacturer gives  an  exclusive  right to  a  single  importer),  we  focus  here  on  the  second  type  of 
restrictions. 
Exclusive  dealing  can  be  socially as  well  as  privately beneficial  when  it serves  to  ensure  a 
minimum level of services at the retailers' level (by preventing retailers to divest their efforts into rival 
products and encouraging them to contribute more to the success of  the manufacturer's products) when 
it protects the manufacturer's rights  in  specific investments. On the other hand it can reduce market 
competition with other brands or retailers when a franchisor uses exclusive contracts to foreclose his 
market, or to pre-empt interesting outlet locations or prominent  franchisees.  This latter feature is likely 
to be most harmful when used by well-established franchisors, and when there is a shortage, at least a 
transitory one, of  possible franchisees -- because of  the lack of  space, for example, or of  the absence of 
skilled  franchisees.  It  is  thus  particularly relevant here  to  distinguish  the  situation of experienced 
franchisors  long  established  in  a  market from  the  situation  of new  franchisors  or the  situation  of 
franchisors attempting to enter new markets.  Moreover, since other means exist to ensure a provision 
of  services by the franchisees without risking market foreclosure that raises entry barriers, arguments in 
favour of  exclusive dealing should concentrate on the protection of  the franchisor's specific investment. 
Several  OECD  member  countries  distinguish  between  whether  manufactuerers  are  well-
established in  their markets ("major suppliers") or are  new entrants. In Canada, Article 77.4.a of the 
Competition  Act  allows  competition  authorities  to  exempt  exclusive  dealing  provisions,  for  a 
reasonable period, when these provisions mainly serve to facilitate the entry of a new firm or of a new 
product.  In  its  Bombardier  decision  the  Restrictive  Trade  Practices  Commission  clarified  the 
application of  this article of  the Competition Act and developed an interesting analytical framework for 
the evaluation of the relative importance of Bombardier in its market (including Bombardier's market 31 
share,  financial  strength  and  record  of innovation,  the  evolution  of relative  market  shares,  the 
availability  of other distributors  for  competing  manufacturers,  the  choice  offered  to  consumers  in 
remote  locations  ... ).  In  the  United  States,  the  decision  of the  Supreme  Court  in  Tampa  Electric 
v.  Nashville  Coal pointed toward evaluating the  internal efficiency and  market effects of exclusivity 
provisions,  rather than  looking  more  mechanically  only  at  market  shares.  The  decision,  however, 
provided  little guidance about how this analysis should be  carried out (recall that the Court simply 
asserted that affecting 0.77 per cent of  the coal market was not significant enough to be considered as a 
violation of competition regulations).  Subsequent decisions  have  applied  such  an  approach.  In  the 
Be/tone Electronics case, the Federal Trade Commission applied a general analysis of the economic 
effects in finding acceptable the exclusive dealing provisions of a manufacturer with a 7 to  8 per cent 
market share.  The Commission reached a decision on the grounds that this manufacturer's sales were 
declining (so that the exclusive dealing arrangement could be interpreted as a way of  placing the firm in 
a good position for a new start), that other distributors were available to competing manufacturers, and 
that the arrangement aimed to  stimulate the distributors'  efforts to  promote  Beltone's products.  The 
Commission,  however,  did  not  discuss  the  possibility  that  exclusive  dealing  protected  the 
manufacturer's  investments  except for  citing the  need  to  protect  its  "investments"  in  clients that  it 
referred to its distributors. 
The  standards  set  in  the  later  7th  Circuit  decision  in  Roland Machinery  Co.  v.  Dresser 
Industries,  Inc.,  749  F.2d.  380,  384  (7th  Cir.  1984),  for  determining  whether  exclusive  dealing  is 
anticompetitive also suggest a willingness to use economic reasoning to analyse the competitive effect 
of exclusive dealing.  Judge Posner said that a plaintiff in an exclusive dealing case must prove that the 
exclusion is "likely to keep at least one significant competitor of  the defendant from doing business in a 
relevant market" and that "the probable (Iiu~ certain) effect of  the exclusion will be to raise prices above 
(and therefore reduce output below) the competitive level or otherwise injure competition."  The second 
condition, determining  whether exclusive dealing is likely to affect prices, involves looking directly at 
whether exclusive dealing allows increased exercise of market power.  The first condition, determining 
whether a competitor is  kept from  doing business,  is  more problematic.  Keeping a competitor from 
doing  business  is  one  means  by  which  exclusive  dealing  might  harm  competition,  particularly  if 
"competitor"  is  interpreted to  include  potential entrants  as  well  as  firms  that  have  supplied  or  are 
supplying the market.  Exclusive dealing, however, also could harm competition without preventing 
either existing suppliers or entrants from doing business;  if exclusive dealing provisions raise the costs 
of some rival  suppliers or entrants they may be  unable  to  prevent the  increased exercise of market 
power even though they continue to do business. 
The  European franchise  block exemption regulation  allows  exclusive  dealing  provisions,  but 
only in some situations. First, it draws a distinction between those products which are at the core of the 
franchise agreement, and more secondary products such as  accessories or spare parts, and for which 
exclusive agreements cannot be employed. It does allows exclusivity requirements for other goods or 
services  purchased  by  the  franchisee,  provided  certain  conditions  are  satisfied;  in  particular,  the 
exclusivity  clause  must  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of the  franchisor's  rights,  and  it  must  be 
impossible to achieve similar goals in different ways, such as by specifying objective quality standards. 
The exemption regulation therefore does not apply when the franchisee can buy from  other suppliers 
items which could meet reasonable and explicit quality requirements (except, of course, if the goal of 
the franchise consists exactly in distributing the franchisor's products).  In the same spirit, even if the 
aim of the franchise is the distribution of the franchisor's products, the franchisor cannot prevent his 
franchisees  from  buying  the  franchisor's  products  from  other  franchisees  or  retail  outlets  (  cf.  the 
previous discussion on territorial restrictions). 
The  European  Commission's  emphasis  in  its  list  of acceptable  franchise  provisions  on  the 
necessity of the exclusive arrangement for the protection of the franchisor's rights is significant.  The 
difference between core products and secondary ones is  interesting;  in  many cases quality and other 
efficiency arguments will be stronger for products that are the subject-matter of the franchise.  It is less 
clear how consistently this distinction will draw a line between exclusivity arrangements that do and do 32 
not increase efficiency36. In particular, where there is  little prospect of any effect on  market power, 
exclusivity  arrangements  could  be  allowed  for  a  broader  range  of products  without  much  risk  of 
harming economic efficiency.  Similarly,  the exclusivity requirements for  spare parts or accessories 
could be  interpreted as  a tie-in, and  could be  analysed and accepted as  such  in  some circumstances 
rather  than  being  automatically  ruled  out37.  Also,  the  effect  on  economic  efficiency  of another 
limitation in the block exemption restriction -- the prohibition on preventing a franchisee from  buying 
the franchisor's products from other franchisees-- is not clear.  For example, this prohibition could be 
used by the franchisor to sustain a non-linear tariff -- such as progressive rebates for large quantities --
in  order to give franchisees  incentives to promote the franchisor's  products, a purpose that could be 
completely consistent with economic efficiency.  It could also be  used to  improve protection of the 
franchisor's rights.  On the other hand, allowing franchisees to buy from  each other does not seem to 
create substantial risks of  reduced inter-brand competition or market foreclosure. 
5.  Tie-ins 
Like  all  other vertical  restraints,  tie-ins  may  be  either  harmful  or beneficial,  depending  on 
context.  This is reflected in the laws of the various countries, which generally apply a flexible rule of 
reason.  The United States has been one exception, with tying arrangements being considered per se 
illegal.  This  is  somewhat misleading,  however,  because  a  number of conditions  must  be  satisfied 
before the per se rule is  applied, and under the current standard these conditions involve considerable 
market analysis.  We begin with the definition of  a tying arrangement, then comment on the application 
of  the rule of  reason. 
i.  The definition of  the tying product 
Since tying arrangements require two products, an important legal question, particularly in the 
United States, has been whether two products were involved in an agreement.  This question became 
particularly  important  following  several  decisions,  notably  Susser  v.  Carvel  and  Siegel  v.  Chicken 
Delight, suggesting that the franchisor's brand or trade mark could be a separate tying product.  That in 
tum potentially made  any obligation to  purchase  a  product or service  from  the  franchisor  a  "tied" 
product.  Under some decisions, the selling of an  "XYZ"  shoe might have been found to be  a tying 
arrangement, since it required buying simultaneously the shoe and its "XYZ" trademark. 
The United States courts struggled with this issue for some years.  The Supreme Court's decision 
in Jefferson Parish, however, has provided a new test for separate products, the two-market test, that 
has been widely followed.  A considerable virtue of the Jefferson Parish approach is that it focuses on 
tests  involving  the  market  consequences  of agreements,  rather  than  on  drawing  distinctions  using 
criteria that may have  no  close relationship to market outcomes.  This test does  seem  to prevent a 
finding of separate products and tying arrangements in many situations in which the alleged tie clearly 
could  have  no  adverse  affect  on  market  competition.  Under  Jefferson Parish  a  product  and  its 
trademark could not be two products.  On the other hand, the two-market test would seem to make it 
possible to find that a franchisor's tradename or brand was a product separate from a product or service 
36  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  while  such  obligations  are  stated  in  Article  3  of the 
franchise  block exemption to be  acceptable only  "in so  far as  they are  necessary to protect the 
franchisor's  industrial  or  intellectual  property  rights  or  to  maintain  the  common  identity  and 
reputation  of the  franchised  network", the  non-opposition  procedure  specified  in  Article  6  may 
allow such obligations to be  included in acceptable  agreements even  if they do not meet these 
conditions, so long as the obligations are not expressly prohibited by Article 5. 
37  More generally, obligations covered  by these provisions of the franchise block exemption 
might  be  analysed  as  tying  arrangements  under  U.S.  law.  See  the  comments  below  on  the 
relationship between current U.S. treatment of tying and the EC  block exemp :on regulation. 33 
that could be used by the franchisee without changing the basic nature of the product or service sold 
under the trademark, a circumstance in which it  might be possible for a tying arrangement to reduce 
competition by raising entry barriers. 
In the case of a business-format franchise, the "way-of-doing-business" can be  identified as  a 
distinct product.  The Court of Appeal in Principle v.  McDonald's Corp., was correct to observe that 
"McDonald's offers its franchisees a complete method of doing business from  the design of the menu 
board to the amount of  catsup on the hamburgers".  This "complete method" identifies a product that is 
both demanded and offered:  potential franchisees are interested in acquiring the rights to operate any 
of several  "fast  food"  franchises,  and  there  are  a  variety  of suppliers  including  both  some  bigger 
competitors  (Burger King,  etc.)  and  a  competitive  fringe.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  all 
"ingredients" should necessarily be considered intrinsic parts of  the "product".  Some products sold by a 
franchisee, such as soft drinks and hamburgers, may be in separate product markets;  if so, requiring a 
franchisee,  for  example,  to  distribute  only  some  specific  brand  of drinks  -- putting  aside  quality 
considerations -- clearly looks like a tying arrangement. 
Finally, it is interesting that the Jefferson Parish two-market test brings U.S. jurisprudence on 
tying closer to the position of  the EC franchise block exemption regulation on the types of products that 
franchisees may be obligated to purchase from the franchisor.  Under the EC regulation, an obligation is 
permissible that prevents the franchisee from buying elsewhere products or services that compete with 
those of  the franchisor and are the subject-matter of  the franchise3 8.  Such a product or service and the 
franchisor's trademark would be unlikely to pass the two-market test.  The EC block exemption is much 
more restrictive about requiring franchisees to buy other goods or services, which in some instances at 
least would also be more likely to be found separate from the franchise trademark under the two-market 
test. 
ii. Evaluating the effects of  a tying arrangement 
One  of the  main  arguments  against  tie-ins  involves  the  possibility  that  the  franchisor  has 
"sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in 
the market for the tied product"39.  Tying can indeed leverage market power and be harmful when: 
(i) the franchisor has some market power in the market of the tying product;  and (ii) the franchisor 
forecloses a non-negligible share of  the market for the tied product thereby making entry more difficult. 
The first condition on the franchisor's market power for the tying product has been interpreted in 
various ways, sometimes with a very loose standard.  In the United States, a variety of standards were 
used to determine if there was sufficient economic power over the tying product;  some decisions were 
willing to  accept use  of a  brandname  as  sufficient evidence  of economic  power.  These  standards 
properly have been replaced, especially in Jefferson Parish, with standards based on the franchisor's 
market power in the market for the tying product, rather than on only the less well-defined concept of 
economic power.  The threshold level of market power seems however to have been relatively high.  In 
Jefferson Parish,  for  example,  the  Supreme  Court  considered  that  a  30 per cent  market  share  was 
"insufficient as  a basis to infer market power", even though it recognised at the same time that there 
existed  "market  imperfections"  that  allowed  the  hospital  to  charge  non-competitive  prices;  it  is 
immediately added in the decision of  the Court that "while these factors may generate 'market power' in 
some  abstract sense, they do  not generate the  kind of market power that justifies condemnation  of 
tying"40. 
38  Regulation No.  4087/88, Article  2-3. 
39  Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356  U.S.  1 (1958) at p.  6. 
40  Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 et al  v. Hyde, 466 U.S.  2  (1984). 34 
The second condition, which relates to the structure of the market for the tied product, is often 
missing  in  the application of the rule  of reason  to tie-ins.  It is  very  significant,  however,  for  the 
economic impact of a tying arrangement.  Even if  the franchisor succeeds in using a significant market 
power in one market to force his franchisees to buy other goods as well, this may have little impact on 
competition in the other markets if  his franchisees represent only a negligible share of  the customers of 
the other products.  Chicken Delight's requirement to buy packing items, for example, may have had 
only negligible consequences on the competition in the packing industry.  In the U.S., application of  the 
per se rule  against tying does  require a  showing that a  "not insubstantial"  amount of commerce  is 
foreclosed in the market for the tied product.  Courts, however, often have found the necessary showing 
satisfied by evidence on the total  dollar amount of commerce foreclosed  to  competitors  by the tie, 
rather than by evidence on the proportion  of the market for the tied product or on the economic effect 
the tie has in the market for the tied product.  Several circuits, however, have also required a showing 
that tying resulted in the actual foreclosure of competition in the market for the tied product, or that 
there was a substantial danger that the tie would allow the seller to acquire market power in the tied 
product market41. 
In addition, tie-ins can have efficiency-enhancing effects.  One way a tie can enhance efficiency 
is  by preventing inefficient input substitution.  This argument,  however,  does not seem to be  much 
accepted in competition policy jurisprudence as a basis for allowing use of  tying provisions. 
In the United States, Siegel v.  Chicken Delight,  Inc.  provides for another possible efficiency-
enhancing use of  tie-ins.  Rather than requiring any franchise fee or royalties, Chicken Delight used the 
packing items needed in the franchised business operation as a "counting device" to recover a return 
proportional to  the  volume of sales.  This counting device worked well for the  franchisee:  it was 
simple and avoided requiring franchisees to report sales accurately.  The Court of Appeal, however, 
rejected this argument and, although Chicken Delight's franchisees represented a relatively small share 
of customers  for  similar  packing,  condemned  the  tying  requirement;  without  franchise  fees  and 
royalties, the franchisor did not survive very long after the decision. 
Other  possible  efficiency-enhancing  uses  of  arrangements  involve  preservation  of  the 
franchisor's goodwill and quality reputation.  There has been some willingness to consider such uses of 
ties in both the United States and the EC.  In the U.S. in Mozart v.  Mercedes Benz, a tying arrangement 
involving parts was found legal, largely on the grounds that it was justified by the benefits of quality 
control.  The EC franchise block exemption allows franchisors to obligate franchisees to purchase from 
specified sources where  necessary to protect the  identity and reputation of the  network (but only if 
quality standards cannot be specified). 
Whether a tying agreement is in fact necessary to protect quality or otherwise enhance efficiency 
should  be  checked  carefully  in  circumstances  in  which  competition  might  be  threatened.  The 
distinction drawn by the Canadian Restrictive Trade Practices Commission between efficiency effects 
in the joint production of the tying and tied products, on the one hand, and quality arguments used to 
justify tying arrangements for inputs, on the other hand, seems particularly relevant.  It should also be 
checked that alternative methods do not exist with similar efficiency-enhancing effects, if the market 
circumstances described above indicate a risk of  harm to competition.  The EC block exemption allows 
the  designation of suppliers  to  protect quality only if it  is  "impracticable"  to  set objective  quality 
specifications42.  In another U.S. case, Metrix v.  Daimler Benz, the same tying arrangement for parts 
41  The 9th Circuit Court, citing Jefferson Parish, found that this last requirement was satisfied 
by showing a substantial  volume of commerce was foreclosed, suggesting a more market-based 
approach  to the  latter requirement.  For  citations  to  cases  see  ABA  Antitrust  Section  (2d.  ed. 
1984, pp.  88-89,  and  1988, pp.  1-82-84), on  which the discussion of U.S. jurisprudence  in  this 
paragraph is based. 
42  Regulation No.  4087/88, Articles  3-1-a and 3-1-b. 35 
considered in Mozart (but applied to a different distributor) was not allowed on the grounds that there 
were alternative methods available to ensure quality. 
6.  Vertical agreements and franchising 
a.  Vertical agreements 
Quite often in practice, firms do not use a single restraint but bundle several restraints together 
in  a broader vertical agreement.  Standard agreements  for  example  associate  exclusive dealing with 
exclusive territories, and sometimes with no-competition clauses, full-line forcing or other sorts or tie-
ins. The above economic analysis has also shown that several vertical restraints may indeed have to be 
combined together in order to solve a particular coordination problem or to reach a particular objective. 
For example, exclusive territories can be assigned to distributors in order to prevent free-riding, but so 
doing also creates or reinforces double marginalization problems, thereby calling for price ceilings or 
other instruments. Firms may thus have indeed an incentive to use not a single restraint, but rather a 
bundle of  restraints. 
It should be emphasized that a combination of restraints may be preferable to a single one, not 
only for the firms, but also for the consumers. Consider for instance the above free-riding example. In 
the absence of any restraint, no or insufficient retail services would be provided. Assigning exclusive 
territories then induces a higher level of services but also a much higher price, and may thus overall 
adversely affect consumers. In that case, it is  only the combination of exclusive territories and price 
ceilings (or any other equivalent combination) that leads to an outcome that is preferred by consumers. 
This  example  calls  for  two  remarks.  First,  competition  policy  may not  have  to  be  tougher 
towards bundled restraints than towards single ones -- in some instances, it should actually develop a 
more favorable attitude towards bundled restraints. Second, the impact of a given restraint may not be 
evaluated as such, but only in relation with the other restraints being used; in this example, for instance, 
resale  price  maintenance  can  have  desirable  effects  to  limit  the  double  marginalization  problems 
created by the assignment of exclusive territories, but wuold not have such a role  in the absence of 
exclusive territories  -- assuming that a  sufficiently strong  intra-brand  competition  would  then  take 
place. 
The bundling of restraints raises the following issue: should competition rules be developed and 
applied  separately  for  each  specific  restraint  found  in  each  package,  or  should  a  specific  rule  be 
designed for at least some pre-specified standard packages? 
Neither the existence of standard vertical agreements (i.e., standards groups of restraints often 
combined together),  nor the  fact  that the  effect  of each  particular  restraint  depends  on  the  other 
restraints  found  in  the  same  package,  necessarily  imply a  need  to  develop  specific  rules  for  these 
standard agreements:  instead, one should evaluate the respective merits of applying specific rules to 
such standard agreements and of using separate rules for each individual restraint. On the one hand, 
designing specific rules for well-identified packages of restraints may help reducing enforcement costs 
and reaching correct decisions, taking into account the interaction between the various restraints found 
in the package. On the other hand, introducing specific regulations has potential disadvantages. It may 
for example restrict the set of relevant available alternatives and  lead firms  to choose their vertical 
arrangements  not only  for  efficiency  reasons  but  also  because  some  of them  qualify  for  specific 
treatments. The introduction of specific regulations for standard packages may also discourage firms 
from innovating new relationships. In order to be effective, the number of such specific regulations has 
to be kept reasonably limited, and thus regulations will be designed only for most common practices. 
But then, firms may prefer to stick to a given vertical agreement in order to benefit from  its specific 36 
treatment, rather than to introduce desirable changes in the vertical agreement. Note furthermore that, if 
the changes are not introduced, the competition policy will not be adapted, and inertia will certainly be 
excessive. 
b.  Franchising 
Franchise contracts are one particular instance of  vertical agreements bundling several restraints 
together. Although there is no unanimous definition of franchising among the Member countries of the 
European Union, there is a clear consensus that franchise contracts are centered on the licensing of a 
brand name.  Two types of franchises  are  sometimes  identified:  distribution franchises  and  business 
format franchises.  In both cases trademarks play a key role,  but in  the latter case the contract must 
moreover involve a transfer of  know-how from the franchisor to the franchisee. The European franchise 
block exemption regulation focuses on this latter case and identifies a franchise contract as "a package 
of industrial  or  intellectual  property  rights  relating  to  trademarks,  trade  names,  shop  signs,  utility 
models, designs, copyrijhts, know-how or patents which can be exploited for the resale of goods or the 
provision of  services". 4 
Trade-marks or brand-names clearly play an important role in the economic analysis presented 
in  the  previous  section.  In  particular,  many  efficiency-enhancing  arguments  in  favor  of vertical 
restraints are valid mainly when the manufacturer's brand-name is involved. This is particularly true of 
the  arguments  concerning  the  preservation  of the  manufacturer's  "image"  or  reputation  but,  more 
generally speaking, this remark also applies to all the arguments that rely on the promotion of "inter-
brand" competition. It should however be noted that trademarks also play a role  in  the evaluation of 
market power:  although the  existence of a well-established trademark need not  imply an  important 
market power, it does often signal a substantial market power. In that respect, trademarks have again an 
important role in the evaluation of  the impact and desirability of  vertical restraints. 
Likewise, the existence of substantial manufacturer's know-how plays an important role in the 
relationship between this manufacturer and its distributors, and may also play an important role in the 
rationale  and the  impact of vertical restraints  being used.  To  analyze this  more  precisely,  we  now 
review  the  effects  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  in  the  context  of  situations  where  the 
manufacturer's know-how is important. 
i.  Vertical coordination 
Know-how, as all forms of immaterial investment, is very sensitive to free-riding: in the absence 
of any protection, once transferred to a third party, this party may use  it and even diffuse it at will. 
Moreover, usual protection instruments, such as  patents and intellectual property rights, may not be 
easy  to  use  in  the  case  of know-how.  Training  future  franchisees  to  a  certain  way  of conducting 
business  typically goes  beyond  providing those  franchisees  with  a  mere  written  description of this 
know-how:  it  usually  involves  training  sessions,  on-going  technical,  accounting  and  management 
assistance, and so on.  (See the discussion below.) It may very difficult in practice to directly monitor 
the use and diffusion of  such knowledge, once it has been transferred to the franchisee. 
Franchisors'  incentives  to  invest  in  know-how  will  in  general  be  insufficient  if they  cannot 
realize the full returns generated by this know-how. This issue may be of particular importance when 
franchisees  sell  competing  products  as  well  as  the  franchisor's  product,  or when  franchisees  open 
additional outlets that are not part of the franchise network, or terminate the franchise relationship but 
continue in a similar business. 
43  This  quote  is  incomplete;  in  particular,  the  franchise  regulation  moreover  restricts 
attention to end levels (retailing agreements, as opposed to industrial or wholesale agreements). Transferring  know-how  also  involves  some  kind  of investment,  this  time  both  from  the 
franchisor  and  the  franchisee.  Moreover,  these  investments  are  relationship-specific  and  thus  loose 
much  or  all  of their  value  if the  franchise  relationship  is  ended.  Hence,  if the  returns  to  these 
investments are not assured, the risk of opportunistic behavior is  likely to  lead the two parties to an 
under-provision  of such  investments.44  For  example,  a  franchisee  will  be  reluctant  to  make  such 
specific investments if nothing prevents the franchisor from  locating another franchisee  next to  him 
once the investment has been sunk. 
Again, various provisions can be used to solve these coordination problems. One solution is to 
stipulate in  the  contract the  amount and  nature of know-how and  learning involved,  and  to  include 
property rights  attached to the franchisor's  know-how.  If that is  a feasible  solution, the  existence of 
know-how does imply a need for specific regulations, but only the application of  existing regulations on 
intellectual property rights.  In that respect,  it  is  interesting to  note that the  definition of know-how 
adopted in the franchising block exemption regulation is almost identical to the definition adopted  in 
the block exemption for  know-how licensing agreements.45  Also,  in  the Maize Seed decision of the 
European Court of Justice,  the  Court refused to  depart  from  the  application  of general  intellectual 
property  rules. 46  Likewise,  some  of the  United  State  jurisprudence  towards  vertical  restraints  is 
relevant for the U.S. treatment of intellectual property rights and industrial licensing agreements in the 
u.s.47 
There  are  reasons,  however,  why  specific  rules  might  be  valuable  for  franchising  where 
substantial know-how is transferred. As already argued, the know-how transferred within a franchise 
often is  more difficult to describe explicitly than the  intellectual property to  which general rules are 
usually  applied.  Whereas  one  can  for  example  describe  maize  seeds  with  sufficient  precision  to 
reproduce these seeds and their expected characteristics, it may be much more complicated to describe 
with sufficient precision a particular way of conducting a business.  Such  know-how  is  usually not 
communicated  only via written  documents  which  can  be  identified  from  the  beginning,  but  rather 
through appropriate training, on-going technical assistance, etc. Hence, while the intellectual property 
rights set out in the 1984 patent licensing block exemption regulation48 and the 1989 know-how block 
exemption regulations49 may well be appropriate in the case of maize seeds, the same provisions may 
be less well-suited for the kind of  knowledge involved in franchising. 
44  Williamson  (1985)  and  (1989)  have  extensive  discussions of the  general  implications of 
relationship-specific investments. See  Hart-Moore (  1988) and  Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey (  1994) for 
a detailed analysis of the role  of long-term  contracts in  restoring  efficient incentives to invest in 
relationship-specific investments. 
45  European  Economic  Community  Regulation  No.  556/89  on  the  application  of  Article 
85(3) of the Treaty of Rome to certain categories of know-how licensing agreements, published in 
Official  Journal  No.  L  66/1,  4th  March  1989.  In  particular,  both  definitions  emphasize  the 
notions of "secret", "substantial" and  "identified". 
46  Nungesser  v.  Commission,  Case  258/78,  (1982)  E.C.R.  2015.  Exclusive  arrangements 
for  the  reproduction  and  the  distribution  of  a  new  hybrid  maize  seed  were  challenged  by  the 
European Commission.  The  firms  argued  that  exclusivity  was  necessary  to  introduce  the  new 
seeds and thereby to promote competition between those and  other seeds,  but the Court refused 
to distinguish breeders' rights from any other kind of intellectual property rights. 
47  See for example the discussion in OECD  (  1989). 
48  Commission Regulation No.  2349/84, OJ No.  L 219/15, 16  August 1984. 
49  Commission Regulation No. 556/89, OJ No. L 66/1, 4 March 1989. 
37 38 
Other instruments than pure intellectual property rights may thus have to be used to protect both 
parties'  specific  investments  in  know-how.  On  the  one  hand,  exclusive  dealing  provisions  and  no-
competition clauses prevent franchisees from  appropriating the benefits of know-how by distributing 
competing products or by engaging in  similar activities. On the other hand, exclusive territories help 
ensure  that  franchisees  will  earn  a  return  on  investments  they  sink.  The  agreement  may  specify 
investments from  one or both parties, that may play the  role  of "hostages"  or "bonding devices"  to 
prevent opportunistic  behavior.  Note  that  in  the  context of franchisinge  the  contracting  parties  can 
indeed use  a variety of alternative ways of remunerating the franchisor's  know-how -- for  example, 
franchisees' contributions to advertising, paying royalties to the franchisor, or agreements to distribute 
franchisor's products other than those directly concerned by the franchise agreements.  This is a much 
wider range of  potential methods of  remuneration than available in many patent or know-how licensing 
agreements outside of franchising. For all of these reasons, franchise contracts may deserve distinctive 
treatment.  SO 
Lastly, note that the coordination problems described here are similar to free-rider problems and, 
as such, are likely to lead to insufficient investment from the standpoint of efficiency as well as profits. 
Hence, provisions that allow for a better coordination in this domain can improve efficiency as well as 
profits. 
ii. Positive effects on inter-brand competition 
Franchise  agreements  can  positively  affect  inter-brand  competition  in  several  ways.  First, 
precisely  because  they  increase  the  incentives  to  invest  in  know-how,  they  promote  the  entry  of 
innovative technologies. This  is  clearly the case when provisions protect the franchisor's  intellectual 
property rights by limiting unauthorized use of the know-how.  This effect may again be particularly 
important when the franchisor's know-how concerns his experience in conducting business, a form  of 
knowledge difficult to protect through patents or licensing agreements. 
In such cases, provisions that protect know-how may thus have a direct and positive effect on 
inter-brand competition. This applies to  exclusivity provisions that prevent franchisees  from  unduly 
appropriating the benefits of  the franchisor's know-how, either by using it to distribute competing goods 
or by engaging, directly or indirectly, in  activities similar to  those of the  franchisor.  Provisions that 
restrict franchisees after the termination of a franchise agreement may serve a similar purpose and thus 
also have a positive effect on inter-brand competition. 
But  franchise  agreements  may  also  have  an  indirect  effect  on  inter-brand  competition,  by 
increasing the  franchisors'  returns  from  their know-how.  As  already noted,  the  provisions  found  in 
franchise  agreements  may  solve  coordination  problems  regarding  prices,  quantities,  quality,  retail 
services, etc., thereby increasing the surplus generated by the know-how and reinforcing the incentives 
to  invest  in  know-how.  Even  if efficiency  is  not  increased,  i.e.,  even  if the  restrictions  found  in 
franchise  agreements  increase  profits  but  reduce  total  surplus  ex post,  the  increase  in  profits  still 
contributes to reinforce the ex ante incentives to invest in know-how. Although this remark applies to 
all  forms  of sunk  investments  needed to  enter a market,  it  is  particularly relevant when  the  initial 
investment takes the form  of know-how, because of the possible spillovers and positive externalities 
50  At  the  same  time,  the  difficulty  of  specifying  the  know-how  may  make  the  rule  quite 
fragile.  It is  difficult to  apply  a  rule  that  is  appropriate  when  know-how  has  been  transferred 
without  a  precise  definition  of  what  constitutes  such  know-how.  For  instance,  in  the 
Charles Jourdan  case,  the  franchisor  sold  shoes  through  several  channels,  including  franchised 
retailers  and  "approved"  retailers:  approved  retailers  received  a  limited  amount  of  information 
about  fashion  trends,  whereas  franchisees  also  got  advice  on  management,  decoration, 
advertising, etc. Although the know-how involved in  "approved dealership" arrangements seemed 
much more limited than in franchise agreements, some have argued that the block exemption for 
franchising should also apply to such arrangements. 39 
often generated by innovation and know-how. 51 
Hence, when the effects on the incentives to invest in know-how are considered, provisions that 
allow  the  franchisor  to  more  completely  capture  consumer  surplus,  or  increase  profits  but  reduce 
consumer surplus, may have social benefits even if they do not increase efficiency in the short run.  In 
the  longer run,  they could  lead to  a  larger supply of productive  innovations  by  present and  future 
franchisors. 
Note however that even if allowing larger returns encourages the development of productive 
and  profitable  know-how,  the  effect  on  economic  efficiency  in  the  long  run  is  not  totally  clear. 
Although encouraging the supply of products and services based on new know-how may increase inter-
brand competition among existing firms or result in  new product innovations, it does not necessarily 
increase total surplus; in particular, competition may lead in some instances to too many brands and too 
much product variety.52 
iii.  Negative effects on inter-brand competition 
In the  short-run,  incumbents'  know-how  may  reinforce  their  position  and  limit  competitive 
pressures from  potential entrants. Therefore, they may give more force to types "A"  and  "B"  effects, 
respectively relative to the impact of vertical restraints on  tacit collusion and on  other competition-
dampening effects among existing rivals. Also, in the long run, by making it more difficult for potential 
competitors  to  enter the  market,  the  incumbents'  know-how  may  facilitate  incumbent firms'  entry-
deterrence strategies  (type "C" effects). 
The analysis of  franchise agreements must however also consider both the benefits of  facilitating 
the transmission of  accumulated know-how and skills, and the preservation of firms' incentives to make 
such production investments. As in the case of  R&D races, there can be a conflict between the short-run 
maximization of allocative and productive efficiency and the long-run benefits of ensuring a private 
return to investments in  intellectual property:  firms  need to  be rewarded by earning returns on  their 
investments  in  know-how. 53  Hence,  an  argument could be  made that even  provisions  that restrict 
inter-brand competition could yield benefits if they promote stronger incentives to innovate and invest 
in know-how. It is doubtful, however, that restrictions expected to reduce such inter-brand competition 
should  be  allowed  for  these  reasons.  Doing  so  would  create  an  exception  within  the  structure  of 
competition policy that would invite over-use, and that would be extraordinarily difficult to monitor 
and control. It would be very difficult to evaluate the impact on investment and welfare, and thus very 
difficult to quantify any possible efficiency benefits and balance them against the clear efficiency costs 
of  reduced market competition. 
51  Franchise  agreements  are  sometimes  also  advocated  to  better encourage  the  disclosure 
and  dissemination of information. In  particular, since they tend to lead  to the definition of norms 
and  the  emergence  of  unified  methods,  they  facilitate  the  circulation  of  information  and  the 
functioning  of the  "entrepreneurial  market"  (candidate  entrepreneurs  can  enter the market  more 
easily and choose among a larger number of alternatives). 
52  See  Katz (1989) for further discussion on the impact of interbrand competition on product 
proliferation. 
53  Franchise contracts may in fact help reduce this conflict by allowing the franchisor and the 
franchisee to better coordinate their decisions and  generate not only more profits but also  more 
surplus, and particularly to eliminate double marginalization problems. 40 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The  economic  effects  of vertical  restraints  have  been  grouped  into  two  general  categories: 
effects on vertical intra-brand co-ordination and on inter-brand competition. 
A manufacturer and its distributors together form  a single vertical structure, within which all 
firms' decisions contribute to determine the economic efficiency with which products and services are 
supplied. Moreover, many of these decisions (on pricing, quality, retail effort, etc.) not only affect the 
profits of  the firm (distributor or manufacturer) making the choice, but affects as well the profits of  the 
other firms;  likewise, if distributors compete with each other, one distributor's decisions may directly 
affect  other the  distributors'  profits.  For each  such  decision,  if the  firm  making  the  decision  acts 
independently,  it will  ignore the  spillover effects and,  maximizing  its  individual  profit,  will  fail  to 
maximize the aggregate profits of the vertical structure. Including provisions that increase vertical co-
ordination often will increase the aggregate profits of  the vertical structure. 
Vertical  restraints  can  help  coordination  in  three  different  ways.  First,  decisions  can  be 
coordinated by giving the manufacturer direct control over distributors' decisions, e.g.  by giving the 
manufacturer  the  right  to  specify  retail  services  or  retail  prices.  Second,  vertical  restraints  can 
restructure  incentives;  for  example,  a  two-part  tariff,  combining  a  fixed  fee  and  a  price  equal  to 
marginal cost,  makes the distributor feel  the full  effect of his  decisions on aggregate profits.  Third, 
where  there  are  spillover  effects  between  distributors,  vertical  restraints  can  alter  intra-brand 
competition to reduce the externality; for example, granting exclusive territories may help solve free-
riding in the provision of  retail services. 
Typically, different combinations of vertical restraints  may be  used to  deal with a  particular 
combination of  problems. Vertical restraints that improve vertical co-ordination may increase economic 
efficiency as well as profits. For example, provisions that eliminate double marginalization both reduce 
retail prices and increase profits; hence economic efficiency increases since both profits and consumer 
surplus  increase.  Provisions  that  reduce  the  extent  to  which  vertical  or  horizontal  externalities 
discourage the supply of retail services may result in a more efficient supply of service and quality to 
consumers,  especially  if otherwise  there  would  be  substantial  free-riding  on  retail  services  or 
investments in reputation. Provisions that allow the vertical structure to realize more of the productive 
value of  its investments in know-how may efficiently encourage investments in productive know-how. 
However, the vertical structure will seek to maximize its own profit, which may or may not also 
increase  economic  efficiency.  For  example,  the  choice  of product  quality  or  retail  service  that 
maximizes profit does not necessarily maximize consumer surplus or total surplus; vertical restraints 
that increase vertical coordination over retail service and quality may thus increase economic efficiency 
and also perhaps consumer surplus in some instances, but not necessarily. The greater the competition 
. from other suppliers faced by the vertical structure, however, the more it will be constrained to make 
choi~es that benefit consumers, and therefore, the more it will make choices that increase economic 
efficiency and con~umer  surplus as well as profits. 
The extent of  competition from other brands and retailers, however, may be affected by vertical 
restraints. Vertical restraints may reduce competition among existing suppliers by increasing the risk of 
cartelization -- although only in market environments conducive to cartelization.  They may also reduce 
market competition in  th~ long run if used to erect substantial entry barriers and if competition is not 
already  substantial.  On  the  other  hand,  vertical  restraints  can  also  promote  entry  and  inter-brand 
competition. For example, when vertical restraints increase profits without raising entry barriers, either 41 
, through increased efficiency or increased oligopolistic co-ordination, they promote entry. Also, when 
vertical restraints increase the returns that can be earned from investments in know-how, they promote 
investment in know-how, which in tum may lead to entry ofboth new brands and new retailers. 
Several lessons can be derived from this analysis. 
First, no simple conclusions can be drawn whereby any particular type of vertical restraint --
territorial  restrictions,  tie-ins,  vertical  price  restraints,  etc.  -- will  inevitably  improve  economic 
efficiency or reduce it.  All types of vertical restraints,  including both price and nonprice restrictions, 
may  either  increase  or decrease .  efficiency  and  have  quite  different  economic  effects  in  different 
contexts.  For example,  territorial  restrictions  may  promote  efficiency 'if there  would  otherwise  be 
extensive free riding on retail services, but they may be used by manufacturers as part of  a strategy that 
reduces  inter-brand competition. Consequently, a competition policy that makes a particular vertical 
restraint either always acceptable or always unacceptable will not match the treatment of that vertical 
restraint to its effect on economic efficiency in all circumstances. Also, different provisions sometimes 
may have very similar effects; for example, free  riding may be  reduced by either territorial or price 
restrictions. 
Second, market structure and,  in  particular, the extent of inter-brand  competition  from  other 
manufacturers and retailers is a crucial factor in the analysis of  the effects of  vertical restraints. Where a 
given vertical structure faces  strong competition both from  other brands and  retailers,  there  is  little 
potential for any type of vertical restraint to reduce economic efficiency. Strong competition at both 
levels  ~nsures efficiency both of upstream supply and of distribution services.  Hence,  if the market 
structure -- level of concentration,  conditions of entry,  dynamics,  etc.  -- ensures that there exists a 
vigorous competition among rival vertical structures, vertical restraints are unlikely to harm economic 
efficiency or reduce competition. Conversely, in less competitive markets the risk is much greater that 
vertical restraints can be used to reduce competition or otherwise reduce economic efficiency. 
Note that it is competition in the relevant product and geographic market that is  important for 
determining the effects of vertical restraints on economic efficiency: Competition policy should thus 
focus on the extent of competition in the market from  other brands and from  other retail distribution 
systems,  rather  than  only  on  intra-brand  competition.  Vertical  restraints  may  reduce  intra-brand 
competition without harming economic efficiency; with sufficient competition from  ~ther brands and 
retailers, a single vertical  stru~ture will be unable ito reduce economic efficiency by exercising market 
power even if intra-brand competition is completely eliminated. 
Third, where general market conditions leave open the question of whether a vertical restraint 
will increase or reduce efficiency, economic analysis provides guidance for identifying those specific 
circumstances  in  which  a  particular  restraint  may  reduce  competition  or  efficiency,  or  increase 
efficiency.  For example, economic analysis identifies circumstances in which exclusive dealing might 
be  used  to  raise  entry  barriers  and  circumstances  in  which  reduced  intra-brand  competition  might 
increase efficiency because it prevents free riding. 
Fourth, the analysis should consider both long- and short-run effects of vertical restraints. Even 
if a vertical restraint has a negative or ambiguous effect in the short run, its net long-run effect may be 
positive because the restraint leads to increased entry or investment in intellectual property. 
Policy  design  must  however  also  consider  enforcement  costs.  One  way  to  reduce  the 
enforcement  costs  of case-by-case  analysis  is  to  develop  enforcement  guidelines.  Guidelines  can 
increase the predictability of  reviews by competition policy authorities. The guidelines also may reduce 
the cases requiring detailed analysis by including criteria and procedures for  identifying those cases 
where there is a risk of  anti  competitive effects and where more detailed analysis may be necessary. 42 
Enforcement  costs  may  first  be  controlled  by  establishing  different  rules  or  enforcement 
guidelines depending on the state of inter-brand competition. As a broad framework for making policy 
treatment contingent on market conditions, we can distinguish three market situations: 
Vertical  structures  with  small  market  shares  in  unconcentrated  upstream  and  downstream 
markets, and new or established vertical structures attempting to  enter a new market:  in  such  "safe 
harbor"  situations,  either non-price  or price  restraints  could be  allowed;  only the  minimal  analysis 
needed to establish competitive market conditions is necessary to determine economic effect. 
Vertical structures that are non-negligible and well-established in their market: such situations 
could require a more detailed inquiry into the extent of  competition in the market and, if  then necessary, 
into the effects of  proposed vertical restraints. 
Vertical structures with a dominant position in their market: in such situations, a more detailed 
justification could be required from the firms to show that proposed vertical restraints would enhance 
efficiency without posing substantial risks for inter-brand competition, and that comparable efficiency 
gains could not be realized with lower risks for inter-brand competition. 
In the first type of situation, there is  a strong argument for establishing clear market structure 
criteria so as to determine whether a given vertical structure qualifies for a safe harbor within which 
both non-price and price vertical restraints are allowed. This policy would pose little risk for economic 
efficiency so  long as the criteria were set to ensure competitive market conditions, and enforcement 
costs  could  be  kept  low  by  establishing  criteria  based  on  easily  determined  measures  of market 
structure. Specific choices of market structure indicators and their critical values could be tailored to 
judgments in  different jurisdictions about enforcement costs and the appropriate breadth of the safe 
harbor. 
The design of  policy rules towards vertical restraints in the other two market categories involves 
more  difficult  tradeoffs  between  enforcement  costs  and  allowing  policy  evaluations  to  determine 
whether  provisions  help  or harm  efficiency.  One  possibility  would  be  to  do  sufficient  additional 
analysis to determine if markets are competitive even though the safe harbor criteria are not satisfied. 
Additional analysis might evaluate whether other basic conditions exist that would allow provisions, for 
example,  to  promote  collusion or restrict  future  entry.  If simple  rules  are  used,  rules  of rebuttable 
presumption  or per se  rules  with  carefully  defined  safe  harbors  would  allow  somewhat  greater 
flexibility  than  uniform per se  legality  or  illegality.  The  following  summary  of the  positive  and 
negative effects of  each type of  restraint may help define useful guidelines. 
For each type of restraint and each type of effect mentioned above, the above table summarizes the 
impact on the profits of  the vertical structure ( ), on rivals' profits ( ' -- depending on the context, these 
rivals may be incumbent firms or potential entrants), on consumer surplus (CS) and on total surplus 
(CS), defined as the sum of  all firms' profits and consumer surplus. 
Regarding double marginalization problems, exclusive territories make only things worse for the 
vertical structure, since it exacerbate the retail margin. Hence, in that respect, they tend to increase the 
retail price above the price that would maximize joint profits ( :  -),  which benefit rivals ( ':  +) but 
decreases both consumer and total surplus. Imposing a price ceiling, on the other hand, helps solving 
the double marginalization problem, so that all signs are exactly reversed. Exclusive dealing having no 
clear  link  with  double  marginalization  problems,  a  dot  (.)  appears  in  the  corresponding  cell. 
Both  exclusive  territories,  resale  price  maintenance  and  exclusive  dealing  can  help  solving 
coordination problem relative to the provision of retail services. This clearly increases the joint profits 
of  the vertical structure, has no clear effect on rivals' profits and may either increase or decrease (in the 
case of substantial power, and of a strong divergence among consumers regarding the optimal tradeoff 43 
'between  prices  and  services)  consumer surplus  and  total  welfare.  If there  is  substantial  free-riding 
among  distributors,  however,  vertical  restraints  will  benefits  both  the  firms  and  consumers. 
The same vertical restraints can also be used to help give the manufacturer better incentives to 
invest  into  quality,  know-how,  etc.  Exclusive  dealing  can  have  direct  effects,  by  preventing  the 
distributors from free-riding on the manufacturer's investment, and both exclusive territories and resale 
price  maintenance,  who  help  generating  larger  profits,  can  indirectly  give  the  manufacturer  more 
incentives to invest. When restraints directly aim at preventing free-riding, as it is the case of exclusive 
dealing provisions, they are also likely to contribute also to enhance consumer surplus, hence the "plus" 
sign for both consumer and total surplus. In other situations, however, the impact on consumer surplus 
and total welfare may be more ambiguous (as for retail services). 
Regarding effects on inter-brand competition, all types of restraints can first serve to sustain a 
(downstream) cartel, through a fake vertical agreement; when so used, they clearly increase profits but 
decrease consumer and even total surplus. It has also been shown that exclusive territories can be used 
by  manufacturers  not  only  to  decrease  intra-brand  competition  among  their  retailers,  but  also  to 
strategically dampen upstream  inter-brand competition,  in  which case they have the same  impact as 
cartel  devices.  Likewise  it  has  been  sometimes  argued  (but  not  formally  demonstrated,  hence  the 
question mark) that resale price maintenance might facilitate tacit collusion among competing brands. 
Both exclusive dealing and exclusive territories provisions have also been shown to help deter the entry 
of efficient  entrants,  and  thus  have  again  similar  impacts  (except  that  entry  deterrence  protect 
incumbents' rents but decrease potential entrants' profits, hence the "minus" sign regarding the impact 
on the profits of the other firms).  Lastly,  since all  restraints may in  one way or another be  used to 
increase the profits generated by a vertical structure,they also  increase ex ante  incentives to  enter a 
market, and have in that respect a positive impact both on consumer surplus and on the profits of the 
firms that entered the market and would not have otherwise, but reduce incumbents' profits and have an 
ambiguous impact on total surplus. 
Note  that  many  of  the  ambiguous  impacts  of  "vertical  coordination"  effects  become 
unambiguously positive, both on consumer surplus and total surplus, when inter-brand competition is 
strong  enough.  On  the  other  hand,  when  inter-brand  competition  is  initially  weak,  many  of the 
ambiguous impacts of "entry promotion" effects are  likely to become more unambiguously positive, 
since the risk of  brand proliferation is much smaller. 
Since all of these restraints do restrict competition (at least, intra-brand competition or, in the 
case of exclusive dealing, competition between brands within a particular outlet), they all  fall  under 
Article 85(1). However, they may benefit from  an  exemption under Article 85(3) each time their use 
lead  to  an  increase  in  both  total  and  consumer  surplus  (last  two  columns  in  the  Table  1  ). 44 
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